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# In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1956.

No. 702

KEITH L. MANION, *et al.*,

*Petitioners,*

vs.

KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY,
a corporation,

*Respondent.*

## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

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## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Petitioners (defendants in the trial court) are Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., sued individually and as representatives of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, of its Roanoke Lodge No. 692, and of a class of Kansas City Terminal's employees consisting of 76 persons employed as locomotive engineers, firemen, hostlers and hostler helpers. Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Kansas City Court of Appeals of the State of Missouri entered in the above case on November 5, 1956.

### CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The petitioners appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, to the Supreme Court of Missouri, but the Supreme Court transferred the case on jurisdictional grounds to the Kansas City Court of

Appeals, with the records and briefs then before it. An accompanying opinion by the Supreme Court is reported in 290 S. W. 2d 63, and is also printed in Appendix B, pages 56 to 69. The opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals (not reported) is printed in Appendix A, pages 1 to 15. The Supreme Court of the State of Missouri declined to review the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. See page 16, Appendix A.

## JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Kansas City Court of Appeals was entered on November 5, 1956. A timely motion for rehearing or for transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri was filed on November 20, 1956 and was denied on December 13, 1956. An application to transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri was filed with the Supreme Court on January 7, 1957. This application was denied by the Supreme Court of Missouri on January 14, 1957. The decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, therefore, is the decision of the highest court of the State of Missouri from which a decision can be obtained in this case. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. Section 1257(3).

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Congress, when enacting the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act, take from railway employees the right to strike when dissatisfied because of an accumulation of grievances resulting from their employer's wrongful interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement?

2. Does the Railway Labor Act prohibit strikes over grievances that result from the interpretation and appli-

cation of collective agreements, after the parties have made an effort to settle the dispute by direct negotiation and neither party has submitted the dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision?

3. Does the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board extend to the mediation of a dispute growing out of the interpretation and application of a collective agreement when such dispute creates a labor emergency that threatens to interrupt the operations of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce?

4. May an employer lawfully refuse to confer with the representatives of its employees in an attempt to settle a dispute resulting from the employer's interpretation and application of a collective agreement when the National Mediation Board has proffered its services after the dispute threatens to create a labor emergency and the Board has requested the parties to the dispute to meet and to bargain?

5. May a state court lawfully issue an injunction enjoining railway employees from engaging in a threatened strike over grievances resulting from the interpretation and application of a collective agreement when the National Mediation Board has proffered its services because it has found a labor emergency exists and the Board has not exhausted its responsibility under the Railway Labor Act for settlement of the dispute?

## STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory law involved is the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. Secs. 151-163), the pertinent portions of which are printed in Appendix A at pages 16 to 30.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Prior to the institution of the present suit on March 26, 1954, by the Kansas City Terminal against its engineers, firemen, hostlers and hostler helpers, these employees had been aggrieved for several years at the Terminal's persistent demands that the employees work overtime after completing a day's work of eight hours. The employees tried to remedy this situation in 1951 and again in 1953, by obtaining successive agreements from the Terminal in which it was agreed that overtime work would not be required except under specified circumstances. Notwithstanding this, the Terminal persisted in its demands for overtime services under conditions which the employees considered violative of the terms of the current agreement.

The Terminal has paid for the actual amount of overtime work the employees have performed. But each time the Terminal has requested an employee to work overtime under circumstances that the employee considered were violative of the terms of the agreement, the employee has treated the demand as a request that the employee start a second shift of work, and has accordingly filed a claim for one day's pay. The last agreement limiting overtime work was dated April 16, 1953, and by June 26, 1953, one hundred such time claims had been filed with the Terminal. By September 6, 1954 nearly a thousand such claims had accumulated. The first one hundred such time claims were turned down by the highest operating officer of the Terminal on September 25, 1953.

On December 21, 1953, the employees made a third attempt to correct the cause of their grievance, through collective bargaining. Speaking for the employees, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen requested the Terminal to agree to new conditions restricting its demands for overtime services. The Brotherhood

also requested the Terminal to agree to a money settlement of the accumulated time claims. The Terminal countered these requests by proposing numerous changes in the basic collective agreement.

Conferences were held on these requests, but without visible progress toward settlement. On February 3, 1954, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen distributed a strike ballot among the employees concerned, listing five issues which the Brotherhood had been unable to settle in conferences with the Terminal's officers. The first three issues were time claims, principal among which was the initial group of one hundred overtime-work claims. The fifth issue was the request for a change in the agreement against overtime work. The ballot solicited the employees' votes on the question whether they would be prepared to strike if the Terminal persisted in its refusal to negotiate a settlement of the five issues. The Terminal was formally advised of the distribution of the strike ballot and of the fact that a large majority of the employees approved a withdrawal from service if the situation required such action.

On the same day that the strike ballot was distributed to the employees the Terminal wired the National Mediation Board that it was faced with a threatened work stoppage and requested the Board's mediation services in order that the "status quo" might be maintained. (App. B, p. 51.)

The Brotherhood promptly advised the Mediation Board that it desired the Board to mediate the entire dispute and that the employees would not strike unless and until the mediation procedure failed to produce a settlement. The Board did not mediate the time-claims dispute, however, because of the Terminal's insistence that such disputes should be submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision, and in keeping with this

position the Terminal refused to discuss the time-claims dispute in conferences conducted by the mediator.

By March 25, it was evident that the Terminal would not participate in mediation on the time-claims dispute. The Brotherhood, in consequence, gave notice to the Board on March 26 that the employees would withdraw from service on March 29 because of the time-claims dispute. On the same day, March 26, the National Mediation Board asserted the authority vested in it by Section 5, First (b) of the Railway Labor Act[1]; by proffering its services to mediate the entire dispute. The Board urged the Terminal "to immediately enter conferences with Brotherhood representatives on all matters covered in strike ballot including time claims." (App. B, p. 52.)

The Board's proffer of services proved ineffectual because the Terminal filed the instant suit late on March 26 and obtained from a Missouri state court an order restraining its employees from striking on March 29.

The Terminal's amended petition asserts two grounds in support of its prayer for an injunction against the threatened strike of its employees. It asserts that by the enactment of the Railway Labor Act, Congress has imposed upon railway employees the choice of either submitting their grievances to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision when their grievances result from the interpretation or application of collective agreements, or of abandoning such grievances. The right to strike when aggrieved by such disputes, according to the Terminal, has been taken from railway employees by the Railway Labor Act.

The second ground urged in support of the Terminal's prayer for an injunction against its employees is that the one hundred time claims resulting from the alleged viola-

[1] 45 U. S. C. Sec. 155, First (b).

tion of the agreement against overtime work were outlawed on March 25, 1954, because of a time limitation imposed upon the processing of claims and grievances by Section 17 of an agreement entered into on August 11, 1948, by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and the Switchmen's Union of North America, with the major railroads of the country. The railroads were represented in negotiations leading up to this agreement by three committees known as The Eastern Carriers' Conference Committee, The Southeastern Carriers' Conference Committee, and The Western Carriers' Conference Committee. The Terminal was represented by The Western Carriers' Conference Committee. The chairman of this Committee was Mr. Daniel P. Loomis.

Section 17 provides, in substance, that if "claims or grievances" are not satisfactorily disposed of at the operating level, they may be appealed to the highest officer designated by the carrier to handle claims and grievances. The six-month time limitation provision reads as follows:

> "All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless within six months from the date of said officer's decision proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievances involved."

The Terminal asserts in its amended petition that the defendants did not institute proceedings "before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law" to enforce the one hundred time claims within the time permitted by Section 17.

The petitioners, by their answer, deny that the right to strike over grievances has been taken from railway

employees by the Railway Labor Act. The petitioners by their answer assert affirmatively that they instituted proceedings within the time required by Section 17 to keep the one hundred time claims alive in the same manner that they had done on prior occasions; that the National Mediation Board had indicated its willingness to assume jurisdiction over the dispute based upon the time claims by proffering its mediatory services. The petitioners further plead affirmatively that the Terminal wrongfully declined to respond to the National Mediation Board's proffer of mediation services, and in instituting the instant suit the Terminal unlawfully prevented the Board from performing its administrative duties.

At the trial the deposition of Mr. Daniel P. Loomis was introduced into evidence by the defendants. Mr. Loomis was the collective bargaining agent representing the Terminal when the August 11, 1948, agreement containing the contractual limitation provision was negotiated. Mr. Loomis testified that the contractual limitation provision was made a part of the August 11, 1948, agreement at the insistence of the carriers. (App. B, p. 43.) He testified that "the main purpose of the carriers in proposing a limitation on time claims was to set up a reasonable time in which claims should be handled or deemed abandoned and to get rid of stale claims." (App. B, p. 49.)

Mr. Loomis testified regarding the understanding the carriers' bargaining representatives had concerning the meaning of the six-month limitation rule. He testified that it was not the intention of the carriers to exclude the use by the employees of any tribunal available under the Railway Labor Act for the purpose of resolving disputes. He expressly disclaimed that the carriers intended by this agreement to confine employees to the use of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and he affirmatively stated

that the spreading of a strike ballot followed by mediation or the establishment of an emergency board would constitute the institution of proceedings "before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law," hence fulfilling the requirement of the contractual limitation agreement for keeping claims alive. Mr. Loomis testified in this connection:

> "The 1948 agreement was intended to permit whatever steps were open to the organizations under the Railway Labor Act." [2] (App. B, p. 50.)

In keeping with this view, the Brotherhood circulated a strike ballot among the employees on February 3, 1954, and a large majority of the employees voted to authorize a strike. This action led to the proffer of mediation services by the National Mediation Board, and the mediation of the entire dispute would have occurred had it not been thwarted by the tactics of the Terminal.

The trial court, by an order entered July 7, 1955, ruled that it "does hereby find all of the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants." An injunction was entered permanently restraining the defendants from carrying out their threatened strike. (App. B, p. 53.)

A timely appeal was taken from the judgment of the trial court to the Supreme Court of Missouri. (App. B, p. 54.) The validity of the permanent injunction was challenged on three grounds involving Federal questions. These were as follows. First, the Railway Labor Act does not take from railway employees the right to strike over time claims and grievances.

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[2] Mr. Loomis testified that he now construes the Railway Labor Act in the same manner as does the Terminal, which is that the Act requires the submission of grievances resulting from the application of collective agreements to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision, and that a strike based upon such grievances is forbidden by the Act.

Second, the time claims based upon the Terminal's violation of the agreement against overtime work were not outlawed by the six-month contractual limitation rule, because the National Mediation Board is vested by the Railway Labor Act with jurisdiction over disputes of this character when they result in a labor emergency, and a timely strike vote was taken by the defendants which resulted in a proffer of the National Mediation Board's services to both parties.

Third, the Terminal should not be allowed to take advantage of its success in frustrating the effort of the National Mediation Board to mediate the strike dispute, and the issuance by the state court of an injunction in favor of the Terminal under such circumstances is a violation of the Federal doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court transferred the appeal, for jurisdictional reasons, to the Kansas City Court of Appeals for decision by that court upon the records and briefs that were before the Supreme Court. (App. B, p. 69.)

The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment entered by the trial court. (App. A, p. 16.) In doing so it declared that the threatened strike was "violative of both the Bargaining Agreement and the Railway Labor Act." (App. A, p. 15.)

A timely motion for rehearing or, in the alternative, that the case be transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri, was filed with the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and overruled. (App. B, p. 70.) Thereafter a timely motion for transfer of the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri was filed with the Supreme Court. (App. B, p. 70.) This motion was overruled by the Supreme Court of Missouri on January 14, 1957. (App. A, p. 16.)

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Kansas City Court of Appeals has decided Federal questions of substance not heretofore determined by this Court. Foremost among these is the proposition that the Railway Labor Act takes from railway employees the right to strike over grievances.[3]

The last general amending of the Railway Labor Act occurred more than twenty years ago. Yet the proposition that the Congress by those amendments took from railway employees a fundamental right derived from the common law and important to labor above all other rights, to wit, the right to strike over grievances, has only very recently been publicly asserted by employers in the railway industry. It has found support in only two cases known to the petitioners one of which is now before this Court for review on a writ of certiorari (*Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,*

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[3] The court's attention is directed to the opinion in *Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley*, 325 U. S. 711, in which the traditional manner of classifying railway disputes is described as follows:

> "The difference between disputes over grievances and disputes concerning the making of collective agreements is traditional in railway labor affairs. * * *
>
> "The first relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. * * *
>
> "The second class, however, contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which *no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one.* * * * In general the difference is between what are regarded traditionally as the major and the minor disputes of the railway labor world." 325 U. S. 711 at 722. (Italics ours.)

Ostensibly, the dispute involved in the instant case is a dispute over grievances and should accordingly be classified as a "minor dispute." But the dispute fits the category of a "major dispute," because the time claims out of which the dispute developed are asserted primarily in support and aid of a request for a change in the terms of the agreement against overtime work.

*et al.*, Docket No. 313) and the instant decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. The proposition was not sustained in a third decision, *Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, et al. v. Central of Georgia Railway*, Docket No. 84, pending before this Court on a writ of certiorari.

The question whether the right to strike has been taken from railway employees is presented in an uncomplicated setting by the instant case. This contrasts with the two cases now before this Court, wherein, if the carrier's position is sustained, the right to strike will probably be held to be qualified because of the necessity of protecting the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. In both of these cases the dispute had progressed through the collective bargaining stage. The National Mediation Board had also exhausted its authority in attempting to bring about a settlement through mediation. In each instance the employees elected to withdraw from service in an effort to induce the carrier to settle the grievance, after the dispute had been submitted *by the carrier* to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for decision by that tribunal.

*Protecting the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board is not a factor in the instant case.* The Terminal has manifested no inclination to submit the instant dispute to the Adjustment Board. The employees do not desire to submit the dispute to the Adjustment Board.[4]

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[4] The last annual report (twenty-first) of the National Mediation Board to the Congress for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, discloses (p. 40) that the First Division had 3014 cases on its docket at year's end; that during the year 314 cases were disposed of by decision, 339 cases were withdrawn from the docket by agreement of the parties, and 946 new cases were docketed. At this rate of disposition of docketed cases, a delay of some *five years* must currently be anticipated between filing date and award date.

The dispute in the instant case has been in the collective bargaining stage. It has not actually entered the mediation stage because of the Terminal's determination to prevent that method of achieving settlement from being employed. The Terminal asserted in its amended petition that the employees must submit their claims to the Adjustment Board, or abandon them.[5] The courts of Missouri sustained this contention.

The practical effect of the lower court's decision is to substitute a form of compulsory arbitration for the system of collective bargaining supported by the right to strike, which has heretofore often been the means of resolving large blocks of accumulated time claims and other grievances in the railway industry.[6]

The Railway Labor Act contains no specific language that takes from employees the right to strike, whatever the cause of the dispute may be, aside from the prohibition contained in the emergency provisions of the Act which forbids changes being made by either party to a dispute after an emergency board has been appointed by the President.[7] The decision reached by the Missouri courts in this

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[5] When a backlog of time claims provides essential support for a collective bargaining effort undertaken by employees for the purpose of inducing their employer to correct an objectionable working condition, being compelled to file the time claims with the Adjustment Board, which is four to five years behind on its docket of cases, would obviously be a victory for the employer, because it would deprive the time claims of most of their influence in the collective bargaining struggle.

[6] A system of compulsory arbitration of grievances would, in fact, be preferable to the system that would compel all claims and grievances to be decided by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, for compulsory arbitration would have the advantage of enabling the disputants to select the arbiters and would doubtless avoid the four or more years of delay between the filing of a claim and the rendition of an award by the First Division of the Adjustment Board.

[7] 45 U. S. C. Sec. 160.

instance is a conclusion that rests solely for its justification upon an implication derived from the Congressional decision to establish the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Because the Congress saw fit to establish a tribunal having nation-wide jurisdiction to decide railway disputes when submitted by either party to the dispute, it necessarily follows, according to the Terminal's contention, that the right to strike over such disputes was taken from employees by the Congress.

This conclusion is not required by the premise. The privilege of, and the importance attached by employees to, the right to withdraw from their employment when dissatisfied with that employment, is such that a decision holding that the right to strike has been taken from the employees of the railway industry by the Railway Labor Act poses a federal question of great substance. The collective bargaining process depends for its success upon the disputants having substantially equal bargaining powers, which is to say, equal economic strength. A decision that takes from the employees of a whole industry a great part of their bargaining strength, creates a serious threat to the success of the Railway Labor Act as an instrument for assuring the uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce.

The second Federal question decided by the Missouri state courts which has not heretofore been determined by this Court is concerned with the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board. The Mediation Board is described in the Railway Labor Act as "an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government."[8] It is probably correct to say that the Mediation Board is the key instrumentality upon which the success of the Railway Labor Act, as a regulatory scheme for avoiding

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[8] 45 U. S. C. Sec. 154, First.

interruptions to interstate commerce, depends. The legal position asserted by the Terminal in the courts below, and the affirmance of that position by the judgments and opinions of those courts, are a challenge to and an interference with the jurisdiction and statutory responsibility of the Mediation Board.

The Mediation Board's jurisdiction is first put in issue by the Terminal's assertion that the Board does not have jurisdiction to mediate disputes based upon grievances. This assertion is made in connection with the question whether the one hundred time claims became outlawed on March 25, 1954, and hence could not provide the basis for a lawful strike, because proceedings involving the claims had not been instituted by the employees "before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law" within the time required by section 17 of the August 11, 1948, agreement.

Did the threatened strike by the Terminal's employees, resulting from the Terminal's refusal to settle the one hundred time claims, create a "labor emergency" [9] which entitled the Mediation Board to assume jurisdiction of the dispute and to attempt through mediation to bring the parties to agreement? [10] If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the contractual limitation agreement must be interpreted in the light of this fact.

The petitioners have contended throughout this litigation that the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board extends to and includes every kind of employer-employee dispute if the dispute matures to the point of threatening

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[9] 45 U. S. C. Sec. 155, First (b).

[10] This question assumes, for the purposes of argument, that the time-claims dispute is completely divorced from the dispute created by the employees' request for a change in the terms of the agreement against overtime work.

to interrupt the flow of interstate commerce.[11] This includes the situation where a carrier persists in either misapplying or ignoring the terms of a collective agreement and a large backlog of accumulated claims develops which the carrier refuses to settle, and the employees become aggrieved over the situation to the point of taking a strike vote. This situation constitutes, the petitioners contend, a "labor emergency" within the meaning of Section 5, First, (b) of the Railway Labor Act, and the National Mediation Board has the responsibility of entering upon the scene and exercising its mediatory powers to the full in an effort to bring the parties to agreement and maintain the uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce. The taking of the strike vote, followed by the assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute by the National Mediation Board, or an attempt by the Board to assume jurisdiction, is ample notice to the employer that the claims are alive and will be progressed to a conclusion by the interested employees.

The petitioners contend that the taking of a strike vote, followed by a proffer of mediatory services by the Mediation Board, constitutes the institution of proceedings "before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law" within the meaning of this phrase as it was understood by the representatives of the parties to the August 11, 1948, agreement. The one hundred time claims were

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[11] The National Mediation Board, while insisting that disputes resulting from unsettled grievances are primarily the responsibility of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, have nevertheless consistently assumed jurisdiction of such disputes when strikes threaten, and the Board has usually been successful in bringing about a settlement, either through direct negotiations between the parties while aided by a mediator, or by inducing the parties to agree to the establishment of a special tribunal with authority to decide the entire dispute. See the Annual Reports of the National Mediation Board to the Congress.

accordingly not outlawed, and the issuance of a permanent injunction by the Missouri state court against the petitioners to prevent them from engaging in the threatened strike was an unwarranted interference with the petitioners' rights under the common law and under the Railway Labor Act.

The Terminal's actions in this controversy subsequent to February 3, 1954, have been largely controlled by its determination to prevent the National Mediation Board from mediating the time-claims dispute. The Terminal, at the time that it invoked the Board's services and subsequent thereto, advised the Board that it did not consider that that part of the dispute covered by the strike ballot and involving time claims should be mediated by the Board, but rather, should be submitted to the Adjustment Board. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, urged the Mediation Board to assume jurisdiction of the whole dispute.

The Board at first took no decisive stand on the point. It accepted the invocation of its services and begged the question by announcing that it would conduct mediation on all *mediable items* involved in the dispute. (App. B, p. 51.) The Terminal's officers refused to discuss the time-claims dispute with the mediator assigned by the Board to mediate the case.

When the Brotherhood advised the Mediation Board on March 26 that the employees would carry out their February 3 vote to strike over the time-claims dispute by withdrawing from service on March 29, the Board took a decisive step toward performing its statutory duty by requesting both parties to enter conferences covering the whole dispute under its mediation. (App. B, p. 52.) But the Terminal, being determined that the Mediation Board should not succeed in assuming jurisdiction over the time-

claims dispute, immediately sought and obtained a restraining order from the Missouri state court, three days before the strike was set to begin. The Terminal answered the Mediation Board by advising that the threatened strike had been eliminated by the court injunction.

This utter disregard by the Terminal and by the Missouri state courts, of the Mediation Board's authority to assume jurisdiction of a labor dispute that threatens to interrupt interstate commerce, precipitates a Federal question of substance. Whether parties to a railway labor dispute may disregard or otherwise thwart the efforts of the National Mediation Board to perform its responsibilities under the Railway Labor Act, and whether state courts may disregard the Board's assumption of jurisdiction over a railway dispute, pose questions of importance to the railway industry as a whole, which have not been determined by this Court.

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari be granted in this instance.

Respectfully submitted,

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# In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1956.

No. 702.

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vs.

KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY,
a corporation,

*Respondent.*

## APPENDIX OF PETITIONERS.

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## APPENDIX A.

### OPINION BY KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS.

No. 22,522.

IN THE KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS
OCTOBER SESSION 1956.

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KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY,
a Corporation,
*Respondent,*

vs.

KEITH L. MANION, *et al.*,
*Appellants.*

---

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY.
HONORABLE PAUL A. BUZARD, JUDGE.

---

The Railroad, by complaint, sought and the Circuit Court on July 7, 1955, granted an Injunction against the threatened, imminent strike by the national Brotherhood, local lodge and named defendants in a class. Evidence was presented showing that Terminal in Kansas City owns and operates the Union Station and terminal facilities for 12 interstate railroads, its service, including engines and tracks, switching and transfer of passengers, mail, baggage and freight cars. Evidence was also offered tending to show that the proposed strike would not only paralyze Terminal's business, but would cripple the railroad transportation system in Kansas City and adversely affect it throughout the whole area. Defendants generally concede these conclusions.

Thereafter, defendants petitioned to remove this cause to the Federal District Court for the Western Dis-

trict of Missouri. On Terminal's Motion the case was remanded to the state court by Hon. Albert A. Ridge, District Judge. Defendants' Motion for Judgment or in the alternative Motion for New Trial was denied. Defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which court ruled it was without jurisdiction and transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals (see *Kansas City Terminal Railroad Company, v. Keith L. Manion, et al.*, 290 S. W. 2d, 63).

On March 31, 1951, plaintiff and The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing that all claims or grievances by or on behalf of any employee would be processed by presentation to the carrier's designated officer, and could be appealed from rank to rank to the carrier's highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances. Paragraph C, Article 7, of the Agreement provides "All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless within six months from the date of said officer's decision, proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement, of the claim or grievance involved." On April 16, 1953, the "No New Work Rule" amendment was added. This Amendment provided that engineers, firemen, and hostlers would be given no new work after completing an eight-hour day, but that they might be required to finish work assigned before the end of the eight hours and which they were proceeding on at the end of the eight hours.

Many disputes arose between Terminal and the workers, involving interpretation and application of the agreement as amended by the "No New Work Rule." Claims were filed by or on behalf of numerous employees for

penalty pay. These were presented by the Brotherhood through administrative channels to the carrier's highest officer designated to process such claims, all as provided in the agreement. Among others, these facts were stipulated by the parties:

(1) "Payment has been made for all straight-time work by the employees for or on whose behalf claims herein involved have been presented and overtime for hours actually worked has been paid at one and a half times the computed hourly rate of the employee."

(2) That time claims for penalty pay were filed on behalf of or by 1114 engineers and 1069 firemen. These claims were prosecuted through carrier officer channels and appealed to Mr. C. E. Breternitz, the carrier's highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances.

(3) That each of these claims has been denied by the said C. E. Breternitz, the dates of the various denials being set forth in the stipulation.

(4) "That no proceedings to enforce the payment of any of the time claims has ever been instituted by any defendant or by his duly authorized representative before any court or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board or before any tribunal having jurisdiction thereof pursuant to agreement of the parties."

Giving consideration to the denial dates as set out in the Stipulation and the date of the Circuit Court's Injunction, we find that more than six months elapsed between the last final denial and the issuance of the injunction. It could here be stated that "overtime pay" which Terminal paid was time and one half for work hours required over eight in one day. "Penalty pay" which defendants claimed, was for one full day's additional pay, if they were required to work more than the eight hours.

On February 3, 1954, the Brotherhood distributed among its employees a strike ballot on four questions: (1) Time claims based upon the "No New Work Rule." (2) Time claims based upon the Terminal's action in permitting Kansas City Southern crews to do switching at the Cudahy Plant. (3) Miscellaneous time claims based upon other provisions of the agreement. (4) Proposed changes in the terms of the collective agreement. The result was a majority vote for the proposed strike if the Brotherhood was unable to get these claims satisfactorily adjusted.

On February 11, 1954, Terminal invoked the services of the National Mediation Board under Item 4; that is, the proposed changes in the terms of the collective agreement, but took the position that Items 1, 2 and 3, namely, the time claims, were not mediable. Federal Mediator Lane was assigned to this dispute. He came to Kansas City on March 23, 1954, to attempt mediation. Terminal refused to discuss the question of the time claims and reasserted its contention that these were not mediable. The Brotherhood sought mediation on all four issues and declared its willingness to forego striking if the Board would take jurisdiction of the entire dispute, but reasserted its intention to strike if the time claims were not involved. The National Mediation Board recommended that all issues be mediated and the threatened strike be deferred. Both parties adhered to their positions as first declared. The Brotherhood fixed a date for the threatened strike. Terminal secured this Restraining Order. The Mediation Board quietly withdrew. The U. S. District Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri each disclaimed jurisdiction. So, the controversy and particularly the action of the Circuit Court in granting injunctive relief, comes to this Court for appellate review.

In addition to briefs from the plaintiff and defendants we have been favored with briefs from Conference Com-

mittees of both Railway and Labor, as Amici Curiae. As stated on page 67 of Appellants' Brief:

> "This case thus turns upon Federal rights, created by a Federal statute, and this Court is accordingly called upon to decide questions arising under Federal law. State courts have, with certain exceptions, concurrent jurisdiction with Federal courts over civil suits arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. *Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. vs. Bombolis,* 241 U. S. 211; *Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio,* 281 U. S. 470." "State courts, when enforcing rights flowing from Federal laws, should enforce them in the same manner and extent as Federal courts would enforce them in similar suits."

Tersely stated, plaintiff asserted it was entitled to the Injunction on two grounds: (A) The Railway Labor Act prohibits a strike to force payment of time claims. It contends that time claims are "minor disputes," as contrasted with, for example, an effort to enforce collective bargaining demands, or write a new basic contract, either of which would be a "major dispute," to secure adjustment or settlement of which, a strike would be a proper procedural weapon. It says, however, that minor disputes must be referred to the Adjustment Board and a strike to coerce settlement of such lesser disputes has for the general public good and in the interest of labor peace been forbidden by the Act. (B) The proposed strike was a breach of the contract entered into by the parties which provided that time claims be prosecuted to the highest carrier official and after denial claimant had six months and six months only, to institute proceedings before some other tribunal having jurisdiction thereof; (plaintiff claiming this authorized tribunal was the National Adjustment Board); that since claimants permitted six months to elapse after

final denial without proceeding further, the claims under the contract are barred, and that all of these requirements were strictly in conformity with the Act.

Defendants assert that the Railway Labor Act and the judicial precedents interpreting the same do not forbid but rather recognize the right to strike. They claim that the Common Law, too, recognizes, and the Constitution protects, an individual's right to work or not work—a condition which is surely one of the attributes of human liberty. It might be observed here, of course, that the right of an individual person to work or not to work is not involved. We are concerned only with group or concerted action.

The National Railway Labor Act does not exactly spell out either Terminal's or Defendants' interpretation. Federal Courts have differed both as to meaning and application. It is agreed, without exception we think, that in correctly determining the question, we must examine, review, and consider Railway Labor Law as it has developed in America during the past 36 years. We must examine the legislation enacted. We must seek for the legislative purposes. We must abide by authoritative judicial interpretations. All this must be done in the light of national economic change and growth.

With the emergence of big industry in America, engaged in far-flung interstate commerce, employing thousands upon thousands of workers and furnishing products and services required daily by the people, the interest of the national public in labor relations became apparent. Our national transportation system based largely upon railroads was a critical field. It became evident, too, that only by organization through unions could the workers present the force, finance, and capacity to adequately and

effectively present their cause to employers, to the Public and to the Congress.

It has long been recognized that the right to strike and to strike through concerted action is an inherent right. 31 *American Jurisprudence,* Labor, Section 192, says:

> "Generally.—It is the settled general American rule, effected largely without the intervention of legislation, that workmen who are not bound by contract for a definite period, and have not by agreement, freely made, given up such rights, may, without liability, abandon their employment at any time, either singly or in a body, as a means of compelling or attempting to compel their employers to accede to demands for better terms and conditions."

In *American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,* 257 U. S. 184 (1921) Chief Justice Taft said:

> "A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body, in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them. They were withholding their labor of economic value to make him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a lawful purpose has, in many years, not been denied by any court."

Economic growth and change made it inevitable that our national Congress should venture into the field of labor relations. General welfare and interstate commerce offered ample authority. The first effort to control railroad labor relations in any degree began with the Transporta-

tion Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 469). This was at the time the railroads were returned to private control and operation after the war period of Government operation. Congress entered this explosive field with much caution and stayed close to shore. This first Act suggested, approved, and encouraged settlement by peaceful means, of disputes, which might disrupt transportation. It did not limit, alter, or destroy the then existing legal rights of either party. It publicly proclaimed a Congressional interest in and an awareness of the subject.

Six years later the Transportation Act was succeeded by the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 577; 45 U. S. C. A. Secs. 151-160). Here again Congress legislated on the theory of voluntary cooperation of the parties. Machinery for mediation was provided. The interest of the Public in the field was definitely recognized and asserted.

In 1934 the Railway Labor Act was amended. By this Amendment, for the first time carriers and employees were *required* to bargain and to mediate disputes. The Act provides for an Adjustment Board, a Mediation Board, and an Emergency Board. The Mediation Board was not vested with adjudicatory powers. It provided mediation service only, and on "major disputes" alone. The Emergency Board was a body which could be created by the President if he thought the situation or emergency so demanded. Neither of these Boards had the power to decide or force compliance with their recommendations. The Adjustment Board (Sec. 153 (i) 45 U. S. C. A.) was given jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Stated another way, the Mediation Board had jurisdiction to hear "major disputes." Both parties were *required* to submit to this mediation, but this Board had no authority to adjudi-

cate disputes or compel compliance. The Adjustment Board, on the other hand, had jurisdiction of the minor disputes, sometimes styled "grievances." If it held in favor of an employee's claim for time pay and the railroad did not comply, it was only necessary to file a petition in some District Federal Court and the findings of the Adjustment Board are *prima facie* evidence of the facts therein stated (Sec. 153 (p) 45 U. S. C. A.) Those familiar with labor relations and labor law have, I believe, a very definite understanding as to what constitutes "major disputes" and what constitutes "minor disputes."

Commissioner Eastman, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, who was one of the principal authors of the 1934 Amendments, testified as follows before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

> "Well, it is my own opinion that there ought not to be strikes with reference to minor grievances of that sort. I should be very unwilling to take away from the employees the right to strike on major issues, but these are not major issues." (Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 61.)

At a hearing before a senate committee on the bill for the 1934 amendments, the Railroad Brotherhoods' representative, Mr. Harrison, stated:

> " 'These railway labor organizations have always opposed compulsory determination of their controversies. We have lived a long time and got a lot of experience, and we know that these minor cases that develop out of contracts that we make freely, and * * * we are now ready to concede that we can risk having our grievances go to a board and get them determined, and that is a contribution that these organizations are willing to make.' " 325 U. S. 728, note 24, 65 S. Ct. 1292.

The following letter dated June 14, 1934, signed by Commissioner Eastman and Secretary of Labor Miss Perkins, to President Roosevelt, was put before the Senate at 78th Cong. Rec. 12375 (1934), as an expression of Administrative purpose:

> "The Coordinator has drafted amendments to the Railway Labor Act designed to * * * provide for *compulsory* adjustment of individual grievances. * * *
>
> "If the proposed amendments are not enacted * * * a host of strike threats and other labor difficulties will arise this summer, demanding presidential intervention. Similar difficulties are also likely to result because of the unavailability of adequate grievance-adjustment machinery as proposed by the amendments."

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in *T. & N. O. v. Ry. Clerks*, 281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427, speaking on the purpose of the Act, said this: "The Brotherhood insists, and we think rightly, that the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was 'to provide a machinery to prevent strikes.' "

The difference between disputes over time claims and disputes over the making of a new collective agreement is well understood in railway labor circles. As to disputes over grievances it contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded.

In *Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. vs. Burley*, 325 U. S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 1282, the Court said:

> ' "The Act treats the two types of dispute alike in requiring negotiation as the first step toward settlement and therefore in contemplating voluntary action for both at this stage, in the sense that agreement is sought and cannot be compelled. To induce agreement, however, the duty to negotiate is imposed for both grievances and major disputes.

"Beyond the initial stages of negotiation and conference, however, the procedures diverge. 'Major disputes' go first to mediation under the auspices of the National Mediation Board; if that fails, then to acceptance or rejection of arbitration, of. 7; (Brotherhood of Railroad) Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50, 64 S. Ct. 413, 88 L. Ed. 534; and finally to possible presidential intervention to secure adjustment. 10. For their settlement the statutory scheme retains throughout the traditional voluntary processes of negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation. Every facility for bringing about agreement is provided and pressures for mobilizing public opinion are applied. The parties are required to submit to the successive procedures designed to induce agreement. 5, First (b). But compulsions go only to insure that those procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to self-help. No authority is empowered to decide the dispute and no such power is intended, unless the parties themselves agree to arbitration.

"The Course prescribed for the settlement of grievances is very different beyond the initial stage. Thereafter the Act does not leave the parties wholly free, at their own will, to agree or not to agree. On the contrary, one of the main purposes of the 1934 amendments was to provide a more effective process of settlement.

"Prior to 1934 the parties were free at all times to go to court to settle these disputes. * * * Several organizations took strike ballots and thus threatened to interrupt traffic, a factor which among others induced the Coordinator of Transportation to become the principal author and advocate of the amendments. The sponsor in the House insisted that Congress act upon them before adjournment for fear that if no action were taken a railroad crisis might take place * * * the Adjustment Board was created and given power to decide them." '

In *Slocum v. Del. L. & W.*, 339 U. S. 239, 70 S. Ct. 577, the Supreme Court said:

> "The act thus represents a considered effort on the part of Congress to provide effective and desirable administrative remedies for adjustment of railroad-employee disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing agreements. The Adjustment Board is well equipped to exercise its congressionally imposed functions. Its members understand railroad problems and speak the railroad jargon. Long and varied experiences have added to the Board's initial qualifications. Precedents established by it, while not necessarily binding, provide opportunities for a desirable degree of uniformity in the interpretation of agreements throughout the nation's railway systems.
>
> "The paramount importance of having these chosen representatives of railroad and unions adjust grievances and disputes was emphasized by our opinion in *Order of Conductors v. Pitney, supra.*"

In *O. R. C. v. Pitney*, 236 U. S. 561 (p. 566), 66 S. Ct. 322, the Court said of the Adjustment Board:

> "Not only has Congress thus designated an agency peculiarly competent to handle the basic question here involved, but * * * it also intended to leave a minimum responsibility to the courts."

Counsel for Terminal have attached to their brief the complete Opinion of U. S. District Judge Scarlett in *Central of Georgia Railroad v. Brotherhood.* Defendants countered by appending the Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the same case. There the dispute arose over whose job it was to couple and uncouple steam, signal and air hoses. The District Court granted an Injunction. The Fifth Circuit in a 2-1 division, *Brotherhood v. Central of Georgia Railroad Co.*, 229 Fed. 2nd, 901, reversed and dissolved the Injunction. That majority opinion

ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. Secs. 101-115) deprived Federal Courts of jurisdiction to enjoin strikes, and declined to apply the Railway Labor Act. The minority Opinion concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply and that under the Railway Labor Act issuance of the Injunction was right and proper.

In this connection we refer to *Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood*, 229 Fed. 2nd, 926. Here the dispute was over 19 pay claims and 2 claims for reinstatement. The parties conceded the disputes were "minor issues." The 7th Circuit Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply and that under the National Railway Labor Act the Court had jurisdiction to grant, and under the facts did rightly grant, the Injunction.

It should here be noted that on 10-16-56 the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review both the Central Georgia and the Chicago River cases. Pending that review we note that the 1934 amendment setting up the Adjustment Board came two years after passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In *Cook County National Bank v. United States*, 107 U. S. 445, 2 S. Ct. 561, the Court said:

> "A law embracing an entire subject, dealing with it in all its phases, may thus withdraw the subject from the operation of a general law as effectually as though, as to such subject, the general law were in terms repealed. The question is one respecting the intention of the legislature."

In *Virginian Railway Company vs. System Federation*, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, the Court said:

> "Neither the purposes of the later act, as amended, nor its provisions when read, as they must be, in the light of our decision in the Railway Clerks case, supra, lend support to the contention that its enactments,

which are mandatory in form and capable of enforcement by judicial process, were intended to be without legal sanction."

We believe that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act affect the present Injunction only so far as it is not in conflict with the later provisions of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 152, Subd. 9).

Numerous other cases have been cited in the briefs and extensive excerpts from Congressional hearings have been included. Manifestly, this Opinion can include but few of these citations and quotations. However, consideration of Administrative and Congressional expressions of purposes and objectives, the Legislative enactments through the years, as interpreted and solidified by judicial interpretations, and by long experience, leads inexorably to certain sure conclusions:

(1) The legislative purpose was to provide machinery to prevent or at least lessen the likelihood of railroad strikes.

(2) Respecting "major disputes" Government sought to provide a fair and impartial mediation service (Mediation Board). Both labor and management had representatives thereon. Government authorship, supervision, and Public Opinion each contributed to create an impartial atmosphere, to produce fair recommendations and honorable mediation help, but Government through the Congress has been unwilling to force compliance in this field of "major disputes." Either party may refuse to accept. The employees' right through the Union to strike, while delayed by requiring mediation first, is not destroyed.

(3) As to "minor disputes" which definitely includes disputes over time claims, the governmental authority has

determined that the injury to public welfare resulting from a railway labor strike, overbalances, outweighs, and submerges the long recognized right to concertedly strike. The mass of these grievances or minor disputes which arise was also an impelling reason. The law requires the parties to attempt to adjust these controversies among themselves, and if settlement proves impossible, the employees (union) may appeal to the Adjustment Board and upon favorable determination there, the Judgment or finding may be enforced by filing a transcript thereof in a Federal Court. A further objective was to relieve the courts of the necessity of trials on the merits of the mass of grievances and time claims, and controversies which might arise. The Adjustment Board in such disputes was a Referee with power to decide.

Usually these injunctions have been sought in Federal and not State Courts. But, where the threatened strike is violative of both the Bargaining Agreement and the Railway Labor Act, as we find here, the injured party may elect to seek and ought to be able to secure relief in a State Forum. It is abundantly clear that Terminal is without adequate remedy at law. Both the Public and Terminal would suffer irreparable loss if the strike comes. We are unable to find that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting equitable relief. Its Judgment in granting the Injunction ought to be and is, affirmed.

FRED H. MAUGHMER,

Fred H. Maughmer, *Judge, sitting as Special Judge by order of the Supreme Court.*

DEW, *P.J.*, SAMUEL A. DEW, *concurs.*
CAVE, *J.* NICK T. CAVE, *concurs.*

**JUDGMENT OF KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS, ENTERED NOVEMBER 5, 1956.**

Now at this day come again the parties aforesaid, by their respective attorneys, and the Court here being now sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises, doth consider and adjudge that the judgment aforesaid, in form aforesaid, by the said Circuit Court of Jackson County rendered, be in all things affirmed, and stand in full force and effect; and that the said respondent recover against the said appellants costs and charges herein expended, and have therefore execution.

(Opinion filed.)

**ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MISSOURI, OVERRULING APPELLANTS' APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF CASE TO SUPREME COURT.**

Now at this day, on consideration of appellants' application to transfer the above entitled cause from the Kansas City Court of Appeals, it is ordered that said application be, and the same is hereby denied.

**THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, SECTIONS 2, 3, 5 AND 6.**

* * * * *

SEC. 2. Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act is amended to read as follows:

"GENERAL PURPOSES

"(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of

carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

"General Duties

"First. It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.

"Second. All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.

"Third. Representatives, for the purposes of this Act, shall be designated by the respective parties without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives. Representatives of employees for the purposes of this Act need not be persons in the employ of the carrier, and no carrier shall, by interference, influence, or coercion seek in any manner to prevent the designation by its employees as their

representatives of those who or which are not employees of the carrier.

[3] "Fourth. Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act. No carrier, its officers or agents, shall deny or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization or to deduct from the wages of employees any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to labor organizations, or to collect or to assist in the collection of any such dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee, individually, or local representatives of employees from conferring with management during working hours without loss of time, or to prohibit a carrier from furnishing free transportation to its employees while engaged in the business of a labor organization.

[3] "Fifth. No carrier, its officers, or agents shall require any person seeking employment to sign any con-

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[3] Amended by Public Law 914, 81st Cong. (see sec. 2 eleventh).

tract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization; and if any such contract has been enforced prior to the effective date of this Act, then such carrier shall notify the employees by an appropriate order that such contract has been discarded and is no longer binding on them in any way.

"Sixth. In case of a dispute between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees, arising out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, it shall be the duty of the designated representative or representatives of such carrier or carriers and of such employees, within ten days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the part of either party to confer in respect to such dispute, to specify a time and place at which such conference shall be held: *Provided,* (1) That the place so specified shall be situated upon the line of the carrier involved or as otherwise mutually agreed upon; and (2) that the time so specified shall allow the designated conferees reasonable opportunity to reach such place of conference, but shall not exceed twenty days from the receipt of such notice: *And provided further,* That nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede the provisions of any agreement (as to conferences) then in effect between the parties.

"Seventh. No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act."

* * * * *

SEC. 3. Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act is amended to read as follows:

"NATIONAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT—GRIEVANCES—INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS

"SEC. 3. First. There is hereby established a Board, to be known as the 'National Railroad Adjustment Board', the members of which shall be selected within thirty days after approval of this Act, and it is hereby provided—

"(a) That the said Adjustment Board shall consist of thirty-six members, eighteen of whom shall be selected by the carriers and eighteen by such labor organizations of the employees, national in scope, as have been or may be organized in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of this Act.

"(b) The carriers, acting each through its board of directors or its receiver or receivers, trustee or trustees, or through an officer or officers designated for that purpose by such board, trustee or trustees, or receiver or receivers, shall prescribe the rules under which its representatives shall be selected and shall select the representatives of the carriers on the Adjustment Board and designate the division on which each such representative shall serve, but no carrier or system of carriers shall have more than one representative on any division of the Board.

"(c) The national labor organizations as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, acting each through the chief executive or other medium designated by the organization or association thereof, shall prescribe the rules under which the labor members of the Adjustment Board shall be selected and shall select such members and designate the division on which each member shall serve; but no labor organization shall have more than one representative on any division of the Board.

"(d) In case of a permanent or temporary vacancy on the Adjustment Board, the vacancy shall be filled by

selection in the same manner as in the original selection.

"(e) If either the carriers or the labor organizations of the employees fail to select and designate representatives to the Adjustment Board, as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, respectively, within sixty days after the passage of this Act, in case of any original appointment to office of a member of the Adjustment Board, or in a case of vacancy in any such office within thirty days after such vacancy occurs, the Mediation Board shall thereupon directly make the appointment and shall select an individual associated in interest with the carriers or the group of labor organizations of employees, whichever he is to represent.

"(f) In the event a dispute arises as to the right of any national labor organization to participate as per paragraph (c) of this section in the selection and designation of the labor members of the Adjustment Board, the Secretary of Labor shall investigate the claim of such labor organization to participate, and if such claim in the judgment of the Secretary of Labor has merit, the Secretary shall notify the Mediation Board accordingly, and within ten days after receipt of such advice the Mediation Board shall request those national labor organizations duly qualified as per paragraph (c) of this section to participate in the selection and designation of the labor members of the Adjustment Board to select a representative. Such representatives, together with a representative likewise designated by the claimant, and a third or neutral party designated by the Mediation Board, constituting a board of three, shall within thirty days after the appointment of the neutral member investigate the claims of the labor organization desiring participation and decide whether or not it was organized in accordance with section 2 hereof and is otherwise properly qualified to participate in the

selection of the labor members of the Adjustment Board, and the findings of such boards of three shall be final and binding.

"(g) Each member of the Adjustment Board shall be compensated by the party or parties he is to represent. Each third or neutral party selected under the provisions of (f) of this section shall receive from the Mediation Board such compensation as the Mediation Board may fix, together with his necessary traveling expenses and expenses actually incurred for subsistence, or per diem allowance in lieu thereof, subject to the provisions of law applicable thereto, while serving as such third or neutral party.

"(h) The said Adjustment Board shall be composed of four divisions, whose proceedings shall be independent of one another, and the said divisions as well as the number of their members shall be as follows:

"First division: To have jurisdiction over disputes involving train- and yard-service employees of carriers; that is, engineers, firemen, hostlers, and outside hostler helpers, conductors, trainmen, and yard-service employees. This division shall consist of ten members, five of whom shall be selected and designated by the carriers and five of whom shall be selected and designated by the national labor organizations of the employees.

"Second division: To have jurisdiction over disputes involving machinists, boilermakers, blacksmiths, sheet-metal workers, electrical workers, car men, the helpers and apprentices of all the foregoing, coach cleaners, power-house employees, and railroad-shop laborers. This division shall consist of ten members, five of whom shall be selected by the carriers and five by the national labor organizations of the employees.

"Third division: To have jurisdiction over disputes involving station, tower, and telegraph employees, train dispatchers, maintenance-of-way men, clerical employees, freight handlers, express, station, and store employees, signal men, sleeping-car conductors, sleeping-car porters, and maids and dining-car employees. This division shall consist of ten members, five of whom shall be selected by the carriers and five by the national labor organizations of employees.

"Fourth division: To have jurisdiction over disputes involving employees of carriers directly or indirectly engaged in transportation of passengers or property by water, and all other employees of carriers over which jurisdiction is not given to the first, second, and third divisions. This division shall consist of six members, three of whom shall be selected by the carriers and three by the national labor organizations of the employees.

"(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on the date of approval of this Act, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.

"(j) Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment Board

shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.

"(k) Any division of the Adjustment Board shall have authority to empower two or more of its members to conduct hearings and make findings upon disputes, when properly submitted, at any place designated by the division: *Provided, however*, That final awards as to any such dispute must be made by the entire division as hereinafter provided.

"(l) Upon failure of any division to agree upon an award because of a deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote of the division members, as provided in paragraph (n) of this section, then such division shall forthwith agree upon and select a neutral person, to be known as 'referee', to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award. Should the division fail to agree upon and select a referee within ten days of the date of the deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote, then the division, or any member thereof, or the parties or either party to the dispute may certify that fact to the Mediation Board, which Board shall, within ten days from the date of receiving such certificate, select and name the referee to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award. The Mediation Board shall be bound by the same provisions in the appointment of these neutral referees as are provided elsewhere in this Act for the appointment of arbitrators and shall fix and pay the compensation of such referees.

"(m) The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding

upon both parties to the dispute, except in so far as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute.

"(n) A majority vote of all members of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be competent to make an award with respect to any dispute submitted to it.

"(o) In case of an award by any division of the Adjustment Board in favor of petitioner, the division of the Board shall make an order, directed to the carrier, to make the award effective and, if the award includes a requirement for the payment of money, to pay the employee the sum to which he is entitled under the award on or before a day named.

"(p) If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of

the courts of the United States. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.

"(q) All actions at law based upon the provisions of this section shall be begun within two years from the time the cause of action accrues under the award of the division of the Adjustment Board, and not after.

"(r) The several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall maintain headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, meet regularly, and continue in session so long as there is pending before the division any matter within its jurisdiction which has been submitted for its consideration and which has not been disposed of.

"(s) Whenever practicable, the several divisions or subdivisions of the Adjustment Board shall be supplied with suitable quarters in any Federal building located at its place of meeting.

"(t) The Adjustment Board may, subject to the approval of the Mediation Board, employ and fix the compensations of such assistants as it deems necessary in carrying on its proceedings. The compensation of such employees shall be paid by the Mediation Board.

"(u) The Adjustment Board shall meet within forty days after the approval of this Act and adopt such rules as it deems necessary to control proceedings before the respective divisions and not in conflict with the provisions of this section. Immediately following the meeting of the entire Board and the adoption of such rules, the respective

divisions shall meet and organize by the selection of a chairman, a vice chairman, and a secretary. Thereafter each division shall annually designate one of its members to act as chairman and one of its members to act as vice chairman: *Provided, however,* That the chairmanship and vice chairmanship of any division shall alternate as between the groups, so that both the chairmanship and vice chairmanship shall be held alternately by a representative of the carriers and a representative of the employees. In case of a vacancy, such vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term by the selection of a successor from the same group.

"(v) Each division of the Adjustment Board shall annually prepare and submit a report of its activities to the Mediation Board, and the substance of such report shall be included in the annual report of the Mediation Board to the Congress of the United States. The reports of each division of the Adjustment Board and the annual report of the Mediation Board shall state in detail all cases heard, all actions taken, the names, salaries, and duties of all agencies, employees, and officers receiving compensation from the United States under the authority of this Act, and an account of all moneys appropriated by Congress pursuant to the authority conferred by this Act and disbursed by such agencies, employees, and officers.

"(w) Any division of the Adjustment Board shall have authority, in its discretion, to establish regional adjustment boards to act in its place and stead for such limited period as such division may determine to be necessary. Carrier members of such regional boards shall be designated in keeping with rules devised for this purpose by the carrier members of the Adjustment Board and the labor members shall be designated in keeping with rules devised for this purpose by the labor members of the Ad-

justment Board. Any such regional board shall, during the time for which it is appointed, have the same authority to conduct hearings, make findings upon disputes, and adopt the same procedure as the division of the Adjustment Board appointing it, and its decisions shall be enforceable to the same extent and under the same processes. A neutral person, as referee, shall be appointed for service in connection with any such regional adjustment board in the same circumstances and manner as provided in paragraph (l) hereof, with respect to a division of the Adjustment Board.

"Second. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any individual carrier, system, or group of carriers and any class or classes of its or their employees, all acting through their representatives, selected in accordance with the provisions of this Act, from mutually agreeing to the establishment of system, group, or regional boards of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes of the character specified in this section. In the event that either party to such a system, group, or regional board of adjustment is dissatisfied with such arrangement, it may upon ninety days' notice to the other party elect to come under the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board."

* * * * *

"FUNCTIONS OF MEDIATION BOARD

"SEC. 5. First. The parties, or either party, to a dispute between an employee or group of employees and a carrier may invoke the services of the Mediation Board in any of the following cases:

"(a) A dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not adjusted by the parties in conference.

"(b) Any other dispute not referable to the National Railroad Adjustment Board and not adjusted in conference between the parties or where conferences are refused.

"The Mediation Board may proffer its services in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time.

"In either event the said Board shall promptly put itself in communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall use its best efforts, by mediation, to bring them to agreement. If such efforts to bring about an amicable settlement through mediation shall be unsuccessful, the said Board shall at once endeavor as its final required action (except as provided in paragraph third of this section and in section 10 of this Act) to induce the parties to submit their controversy to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

"If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under section 10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose."

* * * * *

"SEC. 6. Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended

change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board."

* * * * *

## APPENDIX B.

### AMENDED PETITION FOR INJUNCTION.

No. 573,799. Div. No. 8.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI,
At Kansas City.

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KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY,
a corporation,
*Plaintiff,*

vs.

KEITH L. MANION, *et al.*,
*Defendants.*

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### AMENDED PETITION FOR INJUNCTION.

Now comes plaintiff and, by leave of Court, files its amended petition herein and for its claim for relief against defendants states:

1. Plaintiff (hereinafter called "Terminal") is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri and is an interstate common carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 151, et seq.), having its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. It owns and operates in Kansas City, Missouri, and in Kansas City, Kansas, a Union Station and various terminal and mail facilities, including engines and tracks for the switching and transfer of passenger, mail and baggage, and freight cars, for the use of the twelve interstate railroads running into and out of Kansas City, Missouri, and the United States Post Office.

2. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (hereinafter called "B. L. F. & E.") is a voluntary, unincorporated railroad labor organization, national in scope, and is now, and has since before March 31, 1951, been, the collective bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act for all firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers employed by Terminal. It is represented on Terminal by Roanoke Lodge No. 692. Defendants Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., are members of B. L. F. & E. and of said Lodge No. 692 and are now, and have for a long time been, firemen and engineers employed by Terminal. Defendant Keith L. Manion is the General Chairman of the General Committee of B. L. F. & E. and is the Local Chairman of its Lodge No. 692. M. F. Landes is the Treasurer of said General Committee. J. M. Dibal, Jr., is Recording Secretary of said Lodge No. 692. The interests in this action of each member of B. L. F. & E. and of said Lodge No. 692 and of the class of firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers employed by Terminal are similar to and of the same character as the interests of all members of such union and of such class, differing only with respect to their seniority and assignment. The persons identified in this paragraph fairly and adequately represent B. L. F. & E. and said Lodge No. 692 and the class of which they are members and are sued in this action individually and as such representatives.

3. The other defendants named herein are employed by Terminal as firemen and enginemen and hostlers and hostler helpers and, as such, are represented by B. L. F. & E. under the Railway Labor Act.

4. On March 31, 1951, plaintiff and B. L. F. & E. as collective bargaining representative for all firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers employed by Terminal

executed a collective bargaining agreement at Kansas City, Missouri, as provided for by, and in accordance with the Railway Labor Act whereby, among other things, the parties agreed that all claims or grievances by or on behalf of the employee involved would be processed by presentation to a designated officer of the carrier and appeal through its highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances, and further agreed in subsection (c) of Section 2 of Article VII that, in the event of an adverse decision by such highest officer, all claims or grievances involved therein shall be barred unless within six months from the date of such adverse decision "proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved."

5. On April 14, 1953, plaintiff and B. L. F. & E., as the representative for all firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers employed by Terminal, amended the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement of March 31, 1951, relating to pay for work done in excess of eight hours a day by a supplemental agreement, effective April 16, 1953, which provided that firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers would be given no new work after the expiration of their assigned eight hour period, except that overtime might be required to finish the work being performed at the expiration of the eight hour assignment, or in emergencies. Said collective bargaining agreement of March 31, 1951, as amended by said agreement of April 16, 1953, is and was at all times herein mentioned in full force and effect.

6. Thereafter B. L. F. & E. and the employees it represents claimed that plaintiff violated the April 16, 1953

agreement relating to overtime work and other provisions of the March 31, 1951 agreement; and filed, and are now filing, time claims against plaintiff for penalty pay for overtime and for pay for other work to which they claim to be entitled by plaintiff's alleged violation of said agreement. These claims now aggregate approximately $38,000. Said employees were paid by plaintiff for the overtime they actually worked at the rate of time and one half. The penalty pay claimed is for time not actually worked at the rate of an additional day's wage at time and a half.

7. On June 26, 1953, a substantial number of these time claims growing out of plaintiff's alleged violation of said overtime rule and said other rules were presented to the officer of plaintiff designated to receive them, and on September 25, 1953, the highest officer of plaintiff designated to handle claims and grievances disallowed them. Within sixty days thereafter, B. L. F. & E. notified said officer that his decision was not accepted, but neither B. L. F. & E. as representative of said employees nor any defendant herein individually instituted any proceedings before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claims involved. By reason thereof, said claims are barred by the collective bargaining agreement, and defendants' strike to enforce these claims, as hereinafter alleged, is an unlawful breach of said agreement.

8. On October 23, 1953, and at various times since then prior to May 1, 1954, a substantial number of these time claims growing out of plaintiff's alleged violation of said overtime rule and said other rules were disallowed by the highest officer of plaintiff designated to handle claims and grievances. Within sixty days thereafter, B. L. F. & E. notified said officer that his decision was not accepted, but neither B. L. F. & E. as representative of said

employees nor any defendant herein individually instituted any proceedings before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claims involved. By reason thereof, said claims are barred by the collective bargaining agreement, and defendants' strike to enforce these claims, as hereinafter alleged, is an unlawful breach of said agreement.

9. After May 1, 1954, a substantial number of these time claims growing out of plaintiff's alleged violation of said overtime rule and said other rules were disallowed from time to time by the highest officer of plaintiff designated to handle claims and grievances. Within sixty days thereafter, B. L. F. & E. notified said officer that his decision was not accepted, but neither B. L. F. & E. as representative of said employees nor any defendant herein individually instituted any proceedings before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claims involved. By reason thereof, defendants' strike to enforce these claims, as hereinafter alleged, is an unlawful breach of said agreement.

10. Independent of and apart from the agreement, the Railway Labor Act imposes upon defendants, and each of them, the affirmative duty to pursue and exhaust the administrative remedy available to defendants under said Act which required the orderly prosecution of said time claims before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the only tribunal having jurisdiction under the Act to determine the merits of these time claims, and precludes a strike by defendants to enforce these time claims.

11. Notwithstanding a substantial number of said time claims are barred by the terms of the March 31, 1951, agreement and notwithstanding defendants' contractual duty to institute proceedings as to said time claims not

barred before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement and notwithstanding defendants' legal duty under the Railway Labor Act to pursue and exhaust the remedy of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, defendants unlawfully did, on February 2, 1954, authorize by written ballot a strike against plaintiff and unlawfully did, on March 26, 1954, set a strike date as of 6:00 p. m. on March 29, 1954, and have unlawfully threatened, and are now unlawfully threatening, a strike against plaintiff for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to pay defendants' time claims for penalty pay and for other pay not legally enforceable by any proper tribunal and in violation of defendants' contractual agreement and statutory duties to pursue and exhaust the remedy provided by the contract and the Railway Labor Act.

12. If defendants refuse to operate Terminal switch engines and otherwise perform their customary work in passenger and freight switching service for Terminal and establish and maintain picket lines on and around Terminal property, other employees of plaintiff who are members of other crafts, including switchmen, machinists, mechanics, maintainers, mail and baggage handlers, carmen, inspectors, telegraphers and red caps, will refuse to cross said picket lines and to perform their customary work for Terminal, and employees of the 12 railroads using the facilities of Terminal will refuse to cross said picket lines and to perform their customary work for such railroads with the result that passenger, baggage, and freight service and United States mail service into and out of Kansas City will be disrupted and paralyzed. The movement of passenger, mail and baggage, and freight cars and engines in interstate commerce, and the movement of United States mail, will be seriously impaired,

and this section of the country will be deprived of essential transportation and mail service, by reason of all of which defendants' threatened strike, if not enjoined, will cause irreparable injury to plaintiff's operation and to the uninterrupted flow of interstate passenger and freight traffic and of interstate mail, for all of which the remedy at law is wholly inadequate.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays this Court:

1. To issue its permanent injunction: (a) enjoining and restraining defendants Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., individually and as representatives of B. L. F. & E. and of Roanoke Lodge No. 692 thereof and of the class of firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers employed by Terminal similarly situated, and each of said other defendants individually, and their agents, servants, attorneys, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from attempting to enforce the payment of the aforesaid time claims by: (1) calling, ordering, instructing, recommending, precipitating, encouraging, inducing, permitting, or engaging or participating or taking any part in, in whole or in part or in any wise or manner, a strike against Terminal or on its property and a picket line on or around its property; or (2) slowing down, interfering with, or affecting in any wise or manner the orderly and prompt continuance of work on said property; (b) directing defendants Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., individually and as representatives of B. L. F. & E. and of Roanoke Lodge No. 692 thereof, and their agents, servants, attorneys and employees, forthwith to instruct, and to take all action necessary to insure that such instructions are executed, all members of B. L. F. & E. employed by Terminal and all of such employees it represents to refrain

from and not participate in any wise or manner in a strike or a work slow down against Terminal or a picket line on or around its property for the purpose of attempting to enforce the payment of the aforesaid time claims and to continue in an orderly and expeditious manner their usual employment as firemen, engineers, hostlers, and hostler helpers.

2. For such other and further relief as to this Court seems proper.

LATHROP, RIGHTER, BLACKWELL & PARKER,
HORACE F. BLACKWELL, JR.,
SAM D. PARKER,
*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

(Verification omitted.)

**ANSWER.**

Defendants for their answer to the amended petition herein:

1. Admit the allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the amended petition.

2. Admit that on March 31, 1951, plaintiff and B. L. F. & E. as collective bargaining representative for all firemen, engineers, hostlers and hostler helpers employed by plaintiff executed a collective bargaining agreement in Kansas City, Missouri, as provided for and by the Railway Labor Act and that subsection (c) of Section 2 of Article VII of said agreement is as follows:

> (c) The procedure outlined in Paragraphs (a) and (b) shall govern in appeals taken to each succeeding officer. Decision by the highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances, shall be final and binding unless within sixty days after written

notice of the decision of said officer he is notified in writing that his decision is not accepted. All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless within six months from the date of said officer's decision proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved. It is understood, however, that the parties may by agreement in any particular case extend the six months period herein referred to.

but deny each and every other allegation of Paragraph 4 of the amended petition.

3. Admit that on April 14, 1953, plaintiff and B. L. F. & E. executed a modification of the agreement described in Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's petition, a copy of same being attached to this answer, marked "Exhibit A" and made a part hereof, and deny all other allegations of Paragraph 5 of the amended petition.

4. Admit that certain claims have been and are being filed against plaintiff in the manner in Paragraph 6 of the amended petition stated, but deny all other allegations of Paragraph 6 of the amended petition.

5. Admit that certain claims were presented to the highest officer of plaintiff designated to handle them in the manner in Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the amended petition described, and by him declined, and that notice of disagreement with such declination was given to plaintiff, but deny all other allegations of Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the amended petition.

6. Deny the allegations and legal conclusions in Paragraph 10 of the amended petition contained.

7. Admit that on February 2, 1954, a strike ballot was spread and that defendants did authorize a strike on ac-

count of certain time claims and other matters, and that on March 26, 1954, a time as of 6:00 p.m. on March 29, 1954, was set for strike, but state that defendants have at all times been willing to comply with all orders of the National Mediation Board with respect to said strike, and deny all other allegations of Paragraph 11 of the amended petition.

8. Deny the allegations of Paragraph 12 of the amended petition.

9. State that this Court has no jurisdiction of an action to prevent a strike in interstate commerce by rail, and that exclusive jurisdiction therein is in the National Mediation Board and other tribunals established by federal law.

10. State that this Court has no jurisdiction over an action relating to the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement under the Railway Labor Act, and that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief relating to the interpretation or application of this agreement.

11. State that plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action, has declined the proffered services of the National Mediation Board, and has failed to seek action by the National Railroad Adjustment Board in the premises. No reason exists why said administrative remedies are inadequate.

12. State that in past controversies under the collective agreement between the parties and under prior agreements containing substantially similar terms as to claims, plaintiff has agreed to and acquiesced in the procedure followed by defendants herein in prosecuting claims, and therefore has waived any right to insist on the procedure in the petition described and is estopped to assert that same is required.

13. State that prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint herein the services of the National Mediation Board were invoked with respect to the claims in the petition described, that the National Mediation Board was willing to accept jurisdiction in the premises, and that plaintiff is not entitled in equity and good conscience to judicial relief in the premises.

14. State that the strike in the amended petition described is in no wise illegal or unlawful, and that an injunction against same would deprive defendants of rights of free speech in violation of Articles I and XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of Missouri, would constitute involuntary servitude in violation of Article XIII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of Missouri.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered, defendants pray that plaintiff's petition be *dismissed*, with allowance to defendants for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees on account of the restraining order issued herein.

BLACKMAR, NEWKIRK, EAGER, SWANSON & MIDGLEY,
RALPH M. JONES,
CHARLES B. BLACKMAR,
*Attorneys for Defendants.*

HAROLD C. HEISS,
RUSSELL B. DAY,
*Of Counsel.*

**DEPOSITION BY DANIEL P. LOOMIS, CHAIRMAN, WESTERN CARRIERS' CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.**

DANIEL P. LOOMIS, called as a witness on behalf of the defendants, having been first duly sworn, was examined, and testified as follows, to-wit:

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLACKMAR.

* * * * *

(5) Q. In both of these agreements clauses were written into the agreements covering limitation on time claims, were they not?

Mr. Blackwell: I object to the question. The agreement is the best evidence.

Mr. Blackmar: Let him proceed to answer the question.

Mr. Blackwell: Go ahead and answer it for the record.

The Witness: A. Yes, time limitation rules were (6) written in both agreements. There are differences between them.

Mr. Blackmar: Q. What had been the situation prior to that time with regard to limitation on time clauses?

Mr. Blackwell: I make the same objection to that question, and the further objection that it is completely irrelevant and immaterial and doesn't tend to prove any issue in this case. I am making these objections for the record.

The Witness: Yes, I will answer.

Mr. Blackwell: It will be ruled on by the court later.

The Witness: By and large, I would say there were no time limitations. There were agreements on individual railroads, on some individual railroads of certain kinds for time limitations. There was no national rule. On a good many railroads there were no time limit rules.

Mr. Blackmar: Q. Were national agreements in ef-

fect? A. I would have to inquire what you mean by national agreements?

Q. Well, agreements negotiated on the national basis between associations representing the carriers and the various unions? (7) A. On various matters there are national agreements, such as wages, and some on different types of rules. There is no complete national agreement of any kind.

Q. Your testimony is that there was no national agreement of any kind relating to time claims in that such agreements as there were referring to the limitation on time claims were contained in various local agreements? A. That is correct, prior to 1947.

* * * * *

(12) Q. Then in 1947 notices were served by carriers again for rules changes, were they not? A. Yes.

Q. Were notices served suggesting a change in rules as to limits on time claims in the following language:

> "Decision by the highest officer designated to handle disputes shall be final and binding unless within sixty days after written notice of (13) such decision the said officer is notified in writing that his decision is not accepted. All claims or grievances involved in such decisions shall be barred unless within six months from date of said officer's decision proceedings are instituted before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction established by law or agreement."

Mr. Blackwell: May it be understood that my objection goes to that question and similar questions along this line?

Mr. Blackmar: Surely.

The Witness: A time limit rule or proposal was served by at least most of the railroads that did include such a provision.

Q. And that provision was discussed in the negotiation in which you were acting on behalf of the Western Railroads? A. Yes.

Q. And that applied to both of the two groups of railroad unions that we have just described, did it not? A. It did.

Q. At that time did you hold a power of attorney from the Kansas City Terminal Railway authorizing you to conduct negotiations on its behalf? (14) A. Again I have checked notes and as far as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen are concerned, I haven't checked as to the other organizations, but the agreement of August 11th shows authority for the Kansas City Terminal.

* * * * *

(23) Q. Now, you gave some testimony before an emergency board at Dallas, Texas on February 27th and 28th, 1950, did you not? A. That is correct.

Q. I will show you the document that has been marked Defendants' Exhibit 2 and ask you if you can (24) identify that as a transcript of your testimony given there?

* * * * *

Q. Now, at that time you testified with regard to the meaning of the time limitations claims as contained in the December 12, 1947 agreement with the ORC and the BRT and also in this 1948 agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 1, did you not? A. I certainly testified with respect to the time limit rule contained in both of the agreements referred to and I also testified as to the carriers' interpretation of the time limit rule. That is, I probably should say my own interpretation.

Q. And at that time you gave an interpretation of the phrase contained in Section 17 of Defendants' Exhibit

1, "tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved"? (25) A. The testimony is a little mixed up in places as to whether I was talking about the ORC or BRT agreement or the BLE, BLF&E or SUNA agreement. There was cross examination by different representatives, some on one agreement and some on another.

Q. Here is a question and answer referring to it, page 841 of the transcript, the question asked:

> "Q. Now, is it your testimony that the 4(C) of the Conductors and Trainmen's agreement involving proceedings is subject to the same interpretation placed on the rule for the Engineers and Firemen? A. I think they are substantially the same.
>
> Q. Will you point out—strike that. It is not a fact, Mr. Loomis, that you attempted to get the Conductors and Trainmen Committee to agree to include in the Conductors' and Trainmen's rule that part reading 'Before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement'? A. Yes; the exact proposal was 'before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction established by law or agreement.'
>
> Q. Now, when you signed the agreement, the organizations would not agree to put that in, is that not a fact? (26) A. That is correct.
>
> Q. Now, then, that being true, how do you attempt now to interpret that agreement to mean that? A. Well, the organizations' objection to putting it in was that they were fearful that that might require them to submit all cases to the adjustment board or to arbitration, might rule out the possibility of the steps leading to an emergency board."

Were you asked those questions and did you give those answers at that time?

* * * * *

The Witness: A. I was asked those questions and (27) gave those answers.

Q. And in that testimony you expressed a conclusion that Section 4(C) of the Conductors' and Trainmen's agreement was subject to the same interpretation placed on the rule for the Engineers and Firemen, did you not? A. Well, what I said was, "I think they are substantially the same."

* * * * *

(28) Q. Was there testimony at that time relating to whether or not the spreading of a strike ballot would constitute the institution of proceedings before an appropriate tribunal? A. Yes.

Q. Did you express a conclusion on that point? A. Yes, I think I expressed the view that the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a special adjustment board, an arbitration board, and the spreading of a strike ballot and an emergency board constituted a tribunal or proceedings under the rule, in my opinion, at that time.

Q. I believe you expressed the conclusion that labor organizations might be guilty of laches if it spread a strike ballot and then not do anything about it? A. I think I did.

Q. And you were asked questions—I will give you this to read so that you can follow me:

> "Q. Now, would you say now that your letter of this date includes cases that if we notify them of the proceedings and mediation and emergency boards, would you not interpret your letters as you have there to include taking the case where we go into a strike ballot and (29) mediation and emergency board? A. I think when you invoke mediation those are proceedings.
>
> Q. Would the fact of putting it in strike ballot and getting mediation, would that constitute proceedings? A. I think I would be inclined to con-

cede that point, with one exception, if you spread a strike ballot, then let it ride and didn't do anything about it, then I think you would be guilty of laches.

Q. But where we have put out the ballot and proceed with it and go into mediation, you would hold that that constituted proceedings? A. I would."

* * * * *

**(33)** Q. Now, just to complete the record of the conclusions that you expressed at that time, I will ask you if the questions were asked you as follows and if you made answers as follows:

"Q. Mr. Loomis, I direct your attention, please, sir, to Section C(2) of the December 12, 1947 agreement, which appears as Carriers' Exhibit 27 (d), on Page 5 of that document. Before you arrived here, some point has been made that this agreement does not contain some phraseology 'tribunal provided by law or agreement,' or words to that effect, which does appear in Section 17 of the August 11, 1948 agreement, Engineers and Firemen, and some stress has been laid on the proper interpretation of the word 'proceedings,' in this Section C(2) of the December 12, '47 agreement, and some argument has been made as to what would constitute instituting proceedings under Section C(2) of the December 12, 1947 agreement. Will you please comment on the proper interpretation of that provision of the agreement?"

**(34)** Then I presume this is the answer:

"I think our understanding of the word 'proceeding,' the institution of proceedings covered any of a number of things. Might be the filing of a submission with the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an agreement to arbitrate, an agreement to have a special referee on the property concerned, the spreading of a strike ballot, and an appointment of an emergency board. That, I think, would be the general scope of the institution of proceedings. We had proposed the

language that does appear substantially in the Engineers' and Firemen's agreement. Proceedings are instituted before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction established by law or agreement. In the conference the organizations feared that that was committing them absolutely to the use of the adjustment board or of arbitration, and the language agreed on proceedings instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative, we left out the provision about tribunal of competent jurisdiction so as to include emergency board proceedings or other agreement for handling to dispose of the dispute. Actually, I think under the Engineers' and Firemen's Agreement (35) that an emergency board is likewise a tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

"Q. Mr. Loomis, would you consider—"

I will omit that question. The question that I have previously read you were asked and you did answer subject to objection.

Mr. Blackwell: I will object to that question on the grounds heretofore made.

The Witness: A. I was asked that question and I expressed that view at that time.

* * * * *

(42) Mr. Blackmar: Q. Well, we have another question about the Texas testimony. This question:

"Q. Did the representatives of this particular Brotherhood in that proceeding, with reference to the word 'proceeding,' contend that that was left unqualified because of the variety of choices of procedure which the committees might exercise after the highest designated officer had rendered his decision declining the claim? A. I think that is right.

Q. And one of the contentions was that it may be referred to the chief executive for handling by him or an assigned officer, may be included in a strike ballot, may become subject to the jurisdiction of the

National Mediation Board, may become subject to the supervision of the First Division, National Railroad Adjustment Board, they made those conditions there with reference to the terms of the proceedings? (43) A. At varied times. In fact, at one time during the negotiations there came up the question of possibly writing in something in some way to cover an appeal to the grand lodge board of appeals, or writing in something to cover handling by grand lodge officers. The final conclusion, however, was not to write in any of that and that in the case of handling by grand lodge officers that that could be worked out either by the general chairman and the railroad or by the grand lodge officer and the railroad to arrange for those conferences and for an extension of any time limit to permit that handling."

Were those questions asked and those answers given?

Mr. Blackwell: Same objection.

The Witness: A. Those questions were asked and I gave those answers.

Mr. Blackmar: Q. All right, sir. One question with respect to the time limitation provisions antedating the 1948 agreement, that is the carriers' proposals, what was the purpose of the carriers in proposing that limitation on claims? A. The main purpose of the carriers in proposing (44) a limitation on claims was to set up a reasonable time in which claims should be handled or deemed abandoned and to get rid of stale claims.

Q. That is, to bring— A. To provide a statute of limitations.

Q. That is, to bring about a situation where the carrier could tell what claims were outstanding against it and what claims were not? A. That is correct, to have a period after which the carrier knew the claims were barred and were dead.

* * * * *

CROSS EXAMINATION by MR. BLACKWELL.

* * * * *

(47) Mr. Blackwell: Q. Do you now entertain the view that mediation is a proceeding under the language of the National Firemen's agreement of August 11, 1948? A. No.

Q. Were your reasons for that change in view of those that you have expressed? A. Yes.

Mr. Blackwell: I think that is all.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION by MR. BLACKMAR.

Q. Now, what you just testified to, you are expressing a conclusion that you have reached as to the meaning of the amendments of 1934 of the Railway Labor Act? A. That is correct.

Q. You are not saying that it is your understanding (48) that it was the intention of the 1948 agreement to make any such change? A. Well, let me put it this way: The 1948 agreement was intended to permit whatever steps were open to the organizations under the Railway Labor Act.

Q. I see. A. I think its application depends on the construction of the Railway Labor Act.

* * * * *

**TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY CO. AND NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD.**

WESTERN UNION

E. C. Thompson, Secretary
National Mediation Board
Washington D. C.

February 11, 1954
Kansas City, Mo.

Request invocation of services National Mediation Board under Section 5 of the Railway Labor Act account threatened work stoppage by Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginmen Kansas City Terminal Railway.

Our position is that issues 1, 2 and 3 on strike ballot are proper cases for National Railroad Adjustment Board.

Services of National Mediation Board requested to preserve status quo by the parties.

Regular forms to follow by mail.

C. E. BRETERNITZ
Vice-President

Chge: R. O. Ripley
Building

WESTERN UNION

W. IDA025 DL PD Govt—ID Washington DC 15 Mar 117PME

C. E. Bretenitz, Vice Pres Oprns—
Kansas City Terminal Railway Co KSC

Re exchange correspondence concerning dispute between Kansas City Terminal Railway and Brotherhood Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in connection with the items covered by Brotherhood's strike ballot dated February 2 1954. The National Mediation Board has docketed application for mediation by carrier on all mediable items in this strike ballot as our case No. A-4448. Attention of both parties is called to provisions of Section Six Railway Labor Act. A mediator will be assigned to

handle promptly. Please acknowledge. Joint Breternitz and Gilbert.

E. C. THOMPSON, Secretary
National Mediation Board

WESTERN UNION

1954 MAR 26 PM 4 05

Washington DC 26 435 PME
C. E. Breternitz VP Operations
Kansas City Terminal Railway KC

Re strike date set by BLF&E on Kansas City Terminal Railway for Six PM Monday March 29th National Mediation Board urges carrier to immediately enter conferences with Brotherhood representative on all matters covered in strike ballot including time claims. If carrier agreeable to this procedure Board also requests organization to postpone strike date pending such negotiations. Please acknowledge and advise. Joint Breternitz, Gilbert and Lane.

E. C. THOMPSON, Secretary
National Mediation Board

WESTERN UNION

March 29, 1954

E. C. Thompson, Secy.,
National Mediation Board
Washington, D. C.

Procedure suggested your wire March 26, Kansas City Terminal Railway, acceptable to BLF&E but since carrier has obtained court restraining order against strike set for 6:00 PM March 29, 1954 same is being recessed in deference thereto.

H. E. GILBERT

CHG BLF&E 318 Keith Bldg
10:30 AM SCP: CG

**PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENTERED BY CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI.**

Now this cause, by agreement of all of the parties hereto, having come on for final hearing on plaintiff's amended petition for a permanent injunction and defendants' answer thereto, and the Court, having read and considered the pleadings and having heard and considered the evidence offered by all the parties and the arguments of counsel, does hereby find all of the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., as representatives of and for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (hereinafter called B. L. F. & E.) and of Roanoke Lodge No. 692 thereof and of and for the class of firemen, engineers, hostlers and hostlers helpers employed by plaintiff similarly situated, and the said Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., individually and each of the other defendants herein individually, and all of their agents, servants, attorneys, employees and all persons in active concert or participation with them, be and they hereby are perpetually enjoined and restrained from enforcing or attempting to enforce the payment of any claims for penalty pay for the violations or alleged violations of any of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff and B. L. F. & E., dated March 31, 1951, as heretofore modified, by calling, ordering, instructing, recommending, precipitating, encouraging, inducing, permitting, or engaging or participating or taking part in, in whole or in part or in anywise or manner, any strike against plaintiff or on plaintiff's property and any picketing or picket line in or around plaintiff's property and any slow down or interference with, in anywise or manner, the

orderly and prompt continuance of work on plaintiff's property; and

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said defendants Manion, Landes and Dibal, individually and as representatives of and for B. L. F. & E. and of Roanoke Lodge No. 692 thereof, and their agents, servants, attorneys, and employees, be and they hereby are ordered and directed to forthwith instruct, and to take all action necessary to insure that such instructions are executed, all members of the class of plaintiff's employees represented by B. L. F. & E. as collective bargaining representative to refrain from and not participate in anywise or manner in any strike or a work slow down against plaintiff or the establishment or maintenance of any picket line in or around plaintiff's property for the purpose of enforcing or attempting to enforce the payment of any claims for penalty pay for the violations or alleged violations of any of the provisions of the above described collective bargaining agreement as heretofore modified.

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff have and recover its costs herein incurred and expended, for which let execution issue.

Dated July 7th, 1955.

/s/ PAUL A. BUZARD,
*Judge.*

**STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANTS IN BRIEF FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI AS REQUIRED BY RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.**

I.

The Court erred when it enjoined the defendants from striking, or causing a strike, for the purpose of enforcing the settlement of time claims and grievances, the injunc-

tion being based upon the conclusion that the Railway Labor Act forbids employees striking for such purpose. The Railway Labor Act does not take from employees the right to strike over time claims and grievances.

II.

The Court enjoined the defendants from striking or threatening to strike for the purpose of enforcing the payment of employees' time claims, on the ground that the claims are barred by a six-month contractual limitation provision in a collective agreement applicable to those employees. This was error for the reason that the running of the six-months limitation period was stayed by appropriate proceedings instituted within the period allowed by the terms of the agreement.

III.

The Court violated the Federal doctrine of primary jurisdiction vested in administrative tribunals, by granting the plaintiff's prayer for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against defendants' threat of a strike, when the plaintiff had by its own action frustrated the effort of the National Mediation Board to perform its statutory duty of attempting to settle railway labor disputes through mediation and arbitration in the manner contemplated by the Railway Labor Act.

IV.

Plaintiff does not come into court with clean hands, and should be denied the equitable relief which is sought.

## OPINION BY SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MISSOURI.

[STATEMENT OF CASE]

DALTON, P. J.: Action in equity for an injunction to prevent defendants from engaging in a threatened strike. The defendants include certain representatives of a labor union and other employees of plaintiff as hereinafter referred to. After a hearing, a permanent injunction was ordered and defendants have appealed.

Plaintiff (respondent here) is a corporation and common carrier by railroad, engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 151, *et seq.*). It owns and operates various railroad terminal facilities, including engines and tracks for switching and transfer of railroad equipment for various railroads in Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (hereinafter referred to as Brotherhood) is a voluntary unincorporated railroad labor organization and, since March 31, 1951, it has been the collective bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act for all firemen, engineers, hostlers and hostler helpers employed by plaintiff. Certain named officers of the Brotherhood and all its members as a class were defendants in the action.

[BARGAINING CONTRACT]

On March 31, 1951, plaintiff and the Brotherhood, as collective bargaining representatives for said employees of plaintiff, executed a collective bargaining agreement providing that all claims or grievances by or on behalf of any of the employees involved would be processed by presentation to a designated officer of the carrier and if the claimant were dissatisfied with the decision it could be appealed through to the carrier's highest officer designated to handle

claims and grievances. Subsection 2 of Article VII of said agreement provides:

> "(c) The procedure outlined in Paragraphs (a) and (b) shall govern in appeals taken to each succeeding officer. Decision by the highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances, shall be final and binding unless within sixty days after written notice of the decision of said officer he is notified in writing that his decision is not accepted. All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless, within six months from the date of said officer's decision, proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved. It is understood, however, that the parties may by agreement in any particular case extend the six months period herein referred to."

On April 14, 1953, this collective bargaining agreement was amended by the addition of what is referred to as the "no new work rule." The amendment provides that engineers, firemen and hostlers would be given no new work after completing a day's work of eight hours, except that they might be required to finish the work they were performing at the end of the eight hour day, and that they would also be expected to work overtime in the event of an emergency.

[Disagreement of Parties]

A disagreement arose between plaintiff and its employees as to the meaning of this rule and claims were filed by employees and prosecuted by the Brotherhood for penalty pay for overtime and for pay for other work based upon alleged violations of the agreement by plaintiff. By June 26, 1953, a total of 100 time claims based upon violation of the "no new work rule" had been filed and

four time claims based upon other rules of the collective bargaining agreement, these claims were all rejected by plaintiff's highest designated officer on September 25, 1953. By September 6, 1954, a total of 860 engineers' time claims and 864 firemen's time claims for penalty pay based upon alleged violations of the "no new work rule" had been filed against plaintiff and denied by its highest designated officer. As of November 1, 1954, a total of 2183 time claims in the amount of $54,117.48 had been filed against plaintiff. These claims were declined by plaintiff's designated officer and notice of disagreement with such declination was given to plaintiff.

It was stipulated between the parties, as follows:

> "Payment has been made for all straight time worked by the employees for or on whose behalf claims herein involved have been presented, and overtime for hours actually worked has been paid at one and one half times the computed hourly rate of the employees. The claims filed are for penalty pay in addition to this. * * * No proceedings to enforce the payment of any of the foregoing time claims have ever been instituted by any defendant or his duly authorized representative before any court or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board or before any tribunal having jurisdiction thereof pursuant to agreement of the parties."

[Strike Vote]

Other evidence tended to show that on February 3, 1954, the Brotherhood circulated among the employees what is termed a "Strike Ballot." The document recited the inability of the Brotherhood to obtain adjustment of (1) Time claims based upon violation of the "no new work rule"; (2) Time claims based upon work "farmed out" by plaintiff to employees of another railroad; (3) Miscellaneous time claims based on other contract provi-

sions and other unsettled matters; and (4) Proposed changes in the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. A copy was furnished to plaintiff. The vote was in favor of striking, if no satisfactory adjustment was made, but no date for a strike was set at the time.

[MEDIATION]

On February 11, 1954, plaintiff invoked the services of the National Mediation Board under the heading "Proposed Rule Changes," under the Railway Labor Act to preserve the status quo, but took the position that issues 1, 2, and 3 on the "Strike Ballot" were proper cases for the National Railroad Adjustment Board. On February 15, 1954, the Secretary of the National Mediation Board advised the President of the Brotherhood that plaintiff had so "invoked the Board's services on the question under the heading 'Proposed Rule Changes'." A federal mediator (Lane) was assigned to mediate the dispute and he appeared in Kansas City on March 23, 1954, to attempt mediation "on all mediable items." Plaintiff refused to grant a conference to defendants' representatives to discuss time claims in mediation and contended that these were not mediable matters. The Brotherhood offered, as indicated above, to attempt to settle both contract changes and time claims and maintain the status quo if the Board would take jurisdiction of the entire dispute, but notified Mediator Lane that, if the time claims were not included in the mediation conferences, a strike date would be set. Thereafter, the Brotherhood set a date for a strike and notified the National Mediation Board of this action. The National Mediation Board communicated with both parties and requested that they immediately enter into conferences on the time claims as well as on the rule changes, and that the threatened strike be deferred. The Brother-

hood indicated its agreement, but plaintiff reiterated its claim that the time claims were not mediable matters and, ultimately, advised the National Mediation Board that a restraining order had been obtained in the present case. The Board took no further action.

[EMPLOYER'S CONTENTIONS]

Plaintiff in its amended petition alleged that neither the Brotherhood, as representative of said employees, nor any employee defendant individually "instituted any proceedings before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claims involved"; and that within 60 days after the claims were finally disallowed, they were barred by the collective bargaining agreement; and that defendant's strike to enforce these claims was an unlawful breach of the said agreement. Plaintiff further alleged that "Independent of and apart from the agreement, the Railway Labor Act imposes upon defendants, and each of them, the affirmative duty to pursue and exhaust the administrative remedy available to defendants under said Act which required the orderly prosecution of said time claims before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the only tribunal having jurisdiction under the Act to determine the merits of these time claims, and precludes a strike by defendants to enforce these time claims." Defendants denied this allegation as a legal conclusion.

Plaintiff further alleged that the strike was unlawfully threatened "against plaintiff for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to pay defendants' time claims for penalty pay and for other pay and legally enforceable by any proper tribunal and in violation of defendants' contractual agreement and statutory duties to pursue and exhaust the remedy provided by the contract and the Railway Labor Act." In effect plaintiff charged that defendants had unlawfully

breached their contractual and statutory obligations to plaintiff by calling a strike against plaintiff to enforce the payment of the time claims against it.

[UNION'S CONTENTIONS]

Defendants admitted a strike ballot was spread and that defendants authorized a strike "on account of certain time claims and other matters," but alleged that "defendants have at all times been willing to comply with all orders of the National Mediation Board with respect to said strike." Defendants further alleged that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to prevent a strike in interstate commerce; that it had no jurisdiction over an action relating to the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement; that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the National Mediation Board and other tribunals established by federal law; that plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; that plaintiff had refused the proffered services of the National Mediation Board; that plaintiff had failed to seek action by the National Railroad Adjustment Board; that "prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint herein the services of the National Mediation Board were invoked with respect to the claims in the petition described; that the National Mediation Board was willing to accept jurisdiction in the premises * * *"; and that plaintiff was entitled to no relief in equity.

[TRIAL COURT ORDER]

The judgment entered by the trial court provided:

"* * * that defendant Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., as representatives of and for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (hereinafter called B. L. F. & E.) and of Roanoke Lodge No. 692 thereof and of and for the class of firemen, engineers, hostlers and hostlers' helpers employed by plaintiff similarly situated, and the said

Keith L. Manion, M. F. Landes, and J. M. Dibal, Jr., individually and each of the other defendants herein individually, and all of their agents, servants, attorneys, employees and all persons in active concert or participation with them, *be and they hereby are perpetually enjoined and restrained from enforcing or attempting to enforce the payment of any claims for penalty pay for the violations or alleged violations of any of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement* between plaintiff and B. L. F. & E., dated March 31, 1951, as heretofore modified, *by calling*, ordering, instructing, recommending, precipitating, encouraging, inducing, permitting, or engaging or participating or taking part in, in whole or in part or in anywise or manner, *any strike* against plaintiff or on plaintiff's property and any picketing or picket line in or around plaintiff's property and any slow down or interference with, in anywise or manner, the orderly and prompt continuance of work on plaintiff's property * * *" (Italics ours.)

[JURISDICTION OF APPEAL]

We must first determine whether this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal. Plaintiff-respondent has moved to transfer the case to the Kansas City Court of Appeals on the ground that jurisdiction is exclusively vested in that court and this Court is without jurisdiction.

Appellants say the appeal presents three questions for decision: (1) the right of plaintiff to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the court in the face of an available and unused administrative remedy established by the Congress as a means of preventing strikes by railway employees; (2) whether the time claims denied on September 25, 1953, by plaintiff's "highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances," became barred on March 26, 1954 by reason of the six month contractual limitations provision in a collective agreement applicable to the employees; and (3) "whether the Congress intended to take from the em-

ployees of the railway industry, when it enacted the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act, the right to strike when accumulated time claims and grievances become a source of dispute between a carrier and its employees." As to this last point, appellants say, "The issue concerns the settlement of a grievance concerning overtime work, in which claims for money may be quite incidental to the substance of the grievance." Appellants further insist that "the issue before the court turns upon the interpretation of the Railway Labor Act," and say (1) that the Railway Labor Act does not take from employees the right to strike over time claims and grievances; and (2) that the strike was not a breach of the contract.

The assignments of error in appellants' statement of points and authorities are (1) that the court erred when it enjoined the defendants from striking, or causing a strike, for the purpose of enforcing the settlement of time claims and grievances"; (2) the court erred in holding "the claims barred by a six month contractual limitation provision" for the reason that "the six months limitation period was stayed by appropriate proceedings instituted within the period allowed by the terms of the agreement"; (3) that the decision of the trial court is erroneous and "inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence to grant the extraordinary remedy of injunction to a party who has disregarded the Federal doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and, in doing so, has prevented the defendants from having the remedy available through mediation, arbitration and emergency board proceedings provided by the Railway Labor Act" (the theory being that plaintiff has by its own action frustrated settlement through mediation and arbitration); and (4) that the court erred in not applying the "clean hands" doctrine of equity against the plaintiff.

Appellants insist that we have jurisdiction of the appeal on the ground (1) that the amount involved exceeds $7500; (2) that "the case involves the validity of authority exercised under the laws of the United States"; and (3) that "the case draws into question the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Supremacy clause contained in Article VI of the Constitution of the United States."

[U. S. CONSTITUTION NOT INVOLVED]

Considering the last point first, it has been noted that no assignment of error calls for the construction of any article of or any amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, for that matter no article, section or amendment of the Constitution of the United States is cited or referred to under appellants' statement of points and authorities. Since no such issue is presented, the case is not one "involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States" and we do not have jurisdiction on that ground. *City of St. Louis v. Butler,* 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S. W. 2d 372, 379.

[JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT]

In support of their contention that the amount involved exceeds $7500, appellants insist that the amount in dispute is the amount of the time claims; and that the Court should take judicial notice that the strike on plaintiff's railroad would involve a loss of more than $7500. Appellants further say that "plaintiff seeks an injunction against the defendants' attempt to enforce $54,000 worth of time claims" by striking; that "if plaintiff is successful, then the record shows that there would be no possible remedy still available to defendants as to at least $17,000 worth of

claims"; that, if plaintiff's position (that the only tribunal having jurisdiction over these claims is the National Railroad Adjustment Board) is sustained, then these claims would be forever barred; that "the suit seeks to enjoin defendants individually from striking in order to attempt to obtain as adjustment of the claims in issue"; that "the whole reason for this suit is that the appellants claim that respondent owes them money for breach of contract"; and that "the question here is how appellants may seek enforcement of their claims." Appellants further say "it is patently obvious that respondent stands to gain more than $7500 if it is able to prevent a strike"; and that a brief interruption of respondent's business by a strike "would result in a loss of more than $7500."

As stated, this is an action in equity for an injunction to prevent a strike. The amended petition upon which the cause was tried contains no allegation from which we may determine the pecuniary value to plaintiff of the relief sought, nor the damage to the defendants, should relief be granted, nor vice versa, should relief be denied. The decree granting relief contains no finding with reference to the amount in dispute, nor as to the value of the relief sought and granted. However, it is apparent that the finding and judgment was in no way dependent upon whether the time claims for penalty pay had a pecuniary value in excess of $7500.

The amended petition alleged that defendants and the employees represented "* * * filed, and are now filing, time claims against plaintiff for penalty pay for overtime and for pay for other work to which they claim to be entitled by plaintiff's alleged violation of said agreement. * * * Said employees were paid by plaintiff for the overtime they actually worked at the rate of time and one half. The penalty pay claimed is for time not actually worked at

the rate of an additional day's wage at time and a half." Defendants admitted that such claims had been and were being filed, but denied the other allegations.

No evidence was offered by the parties concerning the pecuniary value of any of these claims; but the facts are stipulated that the claims are not based upon work and labor performed. There was no evidence that the pecuniary value of the claims involved exceeded $7500, and there was no evidence as to the money value to plaintiff of the relief sought or of the loss to defendants if the relief were granted, or vice versa should relief be denied. The well established rule is that "where our jurisdiction is invoked on the basis of the amount in dispute and a money judgment is not sought, then such amount must be determined by the value of the relief to plaintiff, or of the loss to defendant, should the relief be granted, or vice versa, should relief be denied * * * The amount in dispute cannot be left to speculation or conjecture but must affirmatively appear from the record in the cause to be in excess of $7500." *Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller,* 317 Mo. 466, 147 S. W. 2d 670, 671; *Superior Press Brick Co. v. City of St. Louis,* Mo. Sup. 152 S. W. 2d 178, 183. Plaintiff-respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to obtain an injunction and prevent the proposed strike. No other relief was asked. The right to relief by injunction depended upon whether appellants' contemplated strike to enforce the payment of the time claims was legal or illegal. Appellants' manner of enforcement and efforts to enforce the collection of the claims was an issue. The decree only enjoined and restrained the defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the time claims for penalty pay by striking. This Court has no jurisdiction of the appeal on the ground that "the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of Seventy five hundred

dollars." *Fred A. H. Garlich Agency Co. v. Anderson,* 284 Mo. 200, 223 S. W. 641; *Stewart v. Stewart,* Mo. Sup., 269 S. W. 2d 49, 51; *Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, supra,* 147 S. W. 2d 670, 671; *Superior Press Brick Co. v. City of St. Louis, supra,* 152 S. W. 2d 178, 183; *Holland v. City of St. Louis,* Mo. Sup., 262 S. W. 2d 1, 4.

[AUTHORITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW]

Does the appeal involve "the validity of * * * any authority exercised under the laws of the United States"? Appellants' theory is that "the case involved the validity of the action of the National Mediation Board, which is an agency of the United States, and therefore involves the validity of authority exercised under the laws of the United States." Respondent, on the other hand, concedes that appellants' contention (that respondent was required to exhaust its administrative remedies) requires a construction and interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, but respondent claims the appeal raises no question of the validity of the Act or of any authority exercised by the National Mediation Board. Appellants admit that the National Mediation Board "has no authority to force settlement, but rather proceeds by attempting to persuade the parties to reach a voluntary agreement"; that respondent refused to discuss the time claims in mediation; and that "the National Mediation Board ceased its mediatory efforts." Appellants argue that the appellate court "will necessarily have to reach a decision as to the validity of the authority which the National Mediation Board has sought to exercise"; and that respondent "must necessarily maintain its contention that the National Mediation Board has no authority over time claims," hence appellants say the appeal "draws directly into question an authority exercised under the laws of the United States."

The dispute was never finally submitted to the National Mediation Board; the respondent never agreed to submit the time claims to mediation, while appellants refused mediation unless the time claims were admitted; hence no action was taken by the National Board of Mediation and no authority exercised by it is called in question on this appeal. Appellants have cited *Beekman Lmbr. Co. v. Acme Harvester Co.*, 215 Mo. 221, 114 S. W. 1087 and say it is "exactly parallel to this case." In that case a United States District Court had entertained bankruptcy proceedings against the defendant and had enjoined the plaintiff from prosecuting elsewhere its claim on an account for lumber sold to defendant. The plaintiff nevertheless proceeded with its suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, and defendant pleaded the injunction decree in abatement. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, on the ground that the federal court was exercising authority under the laws of the United States and that the validity of the federal proceedings was in issue. We think the case has no application here, where the differences between the parties were never finally submitted to mediation, and the National Mediation Board has exercised no authority because the parties refused to submit their differences to mediation, therefore, the Board ceased its mediatory efforts and abandoned the controversy. No authority exercised by the National Mediation Board under the laws of the United States is called in question in this proceeding. *Kettelhake v. Am. Car & Foundry Co.*, 243 Mo. 412, 417, 147 S. W. 479; *Sound Investment & Realty Co. v. Griffin*, Mo. App., 205 S. W. 2d 257, 260. It further appears that neither of the parties have submitted the time claims to the National Railroad Adjustment Board and no foundation has been laid for its jurisdiction and none has been exercised.

Appellants in their reply brief say that "the issue before the court turns upon an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act" and that the state courts are without jurisdiction to determine the matter, citing *Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.*, 339 U. S. 239 [18 LABOR CASES § 65,694]. If that is true, nevertheless, this Court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. The necessity for an interpretation and application of the terms of a federal statute does not bring the case within the state constitutional provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court on the theory that the validity of authority exercised under the laws of the United States is in question. *Service Purchasing Co. v. Brennan*, Mo. Sup., 32 S. W. 2d 81, 82; *Mitchell v. Joplin Nat. Bank*, Mo. Sup., 201 S. W. 903, 904. And see *Huckleberry v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.*, 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. 2d 980, 988; and *Pashea v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis*, 350 Mo. 132, 165 S. W. 2d 691, 696, as to the existence of a federal question.

While the case requires the construction of a contract entered into between the parties and a consideration of the statutes under which the contract was entered into, we find no basis for this Court's jurisdiction on appeal. The cause should be transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

All concur.

**MANDATE JUDGMENT OF SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MISSOURI, TRANSFERRING CASE TO KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS.**

"Now at this day, it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that the validity of authority exercised under the laws of the United States is not involved herein, that the record does not affirmatively show the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $7,500, and that this Court is therefore without jurisdiction to hear and deter-

mine this cause, the Court doth order that said cause be and the same is hereby transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. (Opinion filed)."

(Certified by Spicer May 31, 1956 as entered April 9, 1956.)

**ORDER OF KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS, DEC. 11, 1956, OVERRULING MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER.**

"Now at this day, the court having considered, and fully understanding the Appellants' motion for rehearing or in the alternative to transfer to the Supreme Court doth consider and adjudge that the said motion be and the same is hereby overruled."

**APPELLANTS' APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF CASE TO SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MISSOURI.**

Appellant Keith L. Manion, and the other Appellants named in the notice of appeal filed herein, respectfully apply to this Court to order the transfer of this cause from the Kansas City Court of Appeals, for the reason that the case involves questions of general interest and importance which have not previously been decided by this Court.

The opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, herein was filed on November 5, 1956. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." A motion for rehearing or in the alternative for transfer to this Court was timely filed and was denied by the Kansas City Court of Appeals on December 12, 1956, at which time a modification was made in the opinion. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." The appeal was originally taken to this Court, and was transferred on jurisdictional grounds, 290 S. W. 2d 63.

The basic facts are stated in the two opinions.

The questions of general interest and importance involved in this case, which have not heretofore been decided by this Court, are as follows:

I. **(a) Does the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S. C. A., Sections 151-160) outlaw or make illegal a strike the object of which is to seek to compel the carrier to adjust claims or grievances, as distinguished from a strike which has as its objective the changing of contract provisions relating to wages, hours and working conditions?**

**(b) Does the Railway Labor Act forbid employees to strike over grievances resulting from the interpretation and application of collective agreements when neither party has sought a decision on the grievances by the National Railroad Adjustment Board?**

The Court of Appeals in its opinion answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a strike for the purpose of enforcing claims and grievances is a violation of the Railway Labor Act. This conclusion was reached in spite of the statement in the opinion "the National Railway Labor Act does not exactly spell out either terminal's or defendant's interpretation." Appellants contend that this holding is in error and that the question should be answered in the negative. At common law a strike over such matters was and is a lawful strike. Nothing in the Railway Labor Act in express terms, or by reasonable implication, modifies the common law rule. Appellants contend therefore that the common law rule remains unchanged.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals makes reference to two cases which discuss a related problem, *Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Company vs. Brotherhood*, 229 F. 2d 926, and *Brotherhood vs. Central of Georgia Railroad Company*, Fifth Circuit, 229 F. 2d 901.* The Courts ruling on these two cases reached diametrically opposite conclusions, and both cases are now in the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari. There is no other authority on the point, either direct or collateral. A problem which is subject to such a divergence of views as is shown by the opinions above referred to should be the subject of further review.

**II. (a) Does the authority of the National Mediation Board extend to the mediation of disputes over the interpretation and application of collective agreements when such disputes create a "local emergency" which threatenes to interrupt the operation of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce?**

**(b) Is the National Mediation Board a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement over claims and grievances, so that mediation services are available when presence of such disputes threaten to disrupt commerce?**

Appellants contended in the Court of Appeals and still contend that the National Mediation Board is "a tri-

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* We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the problem is identical. In both of the cited cases the claims were pending before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Here neither party asked that Board to act, and so there is no possibility of conflict with its decision. We feel therefore that our case against injunctive relief is a stronger one.

bunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement" over the claims and grievances in issue and that these were properly presented to the National Mediation Board.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion did not discuss this point. At page 7 of its opinion the Court of Appeals states:

> "The Mediation Board was not vested with adjudicatory powers. It provided mediation services only, and on 'major disputes' alone."

By "major disputes" the opinion refers to disputes over proposals for changing existing contracts, as distinguished from disputes involving the interpretation or application of existing contracts.

That the Court of Appeals is in error in holding that the National Mediation Board has no power or jurisdiction over disputes involving claims or grievances as shown by the language of the statute, 45 U. S. C., Section 155, which states:

> "The National Mediation Board may proffer its services in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time."

That the National Mediation Board has construed its power as extending to disputes over claims and grievances is shown by reference to its annual reports, which show that on many occasions it has entered into such controversies and has attempted to secure adjustment through mediation. Indeed, the record in this case shows that on a previous occasion the Mediation Board took charge of a dispute which is indistinguishable from this one, and assisted the parties in reaching a voluntary settlement thereof.

Appellants introduced evidence showing the intent of the parties who framed the language of the collective

bargaining agreement here in issue, that proceedings before the National Mediation Board were proceedings before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement within the meaning of the agreement.

The record in this case also shows that a very large proportion of the railroads in the country operate under collective bargaining agreements containing the same language that this agreement contained. A decision in this case will serve as a precedent in the construction of almost every railroad collective bargaining agreement now in existence. This shows the great importance of the question of proper construction of the agreement. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is highly unsatisfactory, as a determination on the law in this field for the reason that it does not discuss this vital point at all.

**III. Does a party seeking an injunction against a strike of employees covered by the Railway Labor Act have the duty of exhausting all available administrative remedies before proceeding in court?**

This point was raised in Appellants' brief in the Court of Appeals. The opinion does not discuss the point at all, but the Court of Appeals must necessarily have resolved the point against the Appellants since it affirmed the granting of the injunction.

It is a general principle of administrative law, applied both by the federal courts and by this court, that a party should not seek judicial relief until he has utilized administrative machinery provided by the law to its fullest extent.

The record in the present case shows that as soon as the National Mediation Board was advised that the union representing Appellants set a strike date, the National

Mediation Board communicated with both parties requesting that the strike be postponed and that they immediately enter into conferences over the time claims under its auspices. Appellants indicated that they were willing to enter into these conferences and to postpone the contemplated strike. Respondent Kansas City Terminal Railway refused services of the National Mediation Board, and refused conferences. Instead of doing this, it immediately filed this action and sought and obtained a temporary restraining order.

We do not see how a clearer case of failure to exhaust administrative remedies could be set forth. Had the parties entered into mediation they might have been able to resolve the entire controversy without the need for judicial intervention. We do not see how any one could predict in advance that mediation would be of no value. In providing the National Mediation Board, and of giving it jurisdiction in every case of threatened labor emergency affecting interstate transportation, Congress must have assumed that this Board would be given the opportunity to act. While the Board was acting, there was no emergency which made an injunction necessary. The Court of Appeals apparently assumed, however, that there is no obligation to try the services of the Mediation Board in a case like this one. This is clearly contrary to all the law we have been able to find on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

**IV. May a state court issue an injunction against a strike by employees covered by the Railway Labor Act?**

The Court of Appeals necessarily answered this question in the affirmative by upholding the injunction which was granted.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held, however, that judicial remedies are available in industries governed by the Railway Labor Act only where specifically authorized by the language of the statute. The following quotation from the case of *General Committee of Adjustment vs. M-K-T Railway*, 320 U. S. 323, is in point:

> "In short, Congress by this legislation has freely employed the traditional instruments of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Those instruments, in addition to the available economic weapons, remain unchanged in large areas of this railway labor field. On only certain phases of this controversial subject has Congress utilized administrative or judicial machinery and invoked the compulsions of the law. Congress was dealing with a subject highly charged with emotion. Its approach has not only been slow; it has been piecemeal. Congress has been highly selective in its use of legal machinery. The delicacy of these problems has made it hesitant to go too fast or too far. The inference is strong that Congress intended to go no further in its use of the processes of adjudication and litigation than the express provisions of the Act indicate."

The holding of the Court of Appeals that a state court may issue an injunction in a case of this kind seems to be squarely in conflict with the principles stated above, and it is important as a matter of general law that this Court take cognizance of the problem.

## Conclusion.

This case involves important problems affecting the entire transportation industry of the country and all of its employees. The application for transfer should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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